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Winning Recounts: Essential Mathematical and Statistical 
Insights for Election Lawyers 
Brian C. Katt• 
Many lawyers joke that they went to law school because there is no 
math required. Unfortunately for them, mathematics is ubiquitous in the 
law, and the lawyers who cannot do it well are at the mercy of those who 
can. Election recounts are a prime example. Recounts happen, candidates 
rely on lawyers to win them, 1 and to do so those lawyers need to grasp the 
mathematics of recounts. 
This Article uses basic mathematics and statistics to construct an 
optimal general strategy for election recounts. As it happens, this strategy 
tracks the conventional wisdom espoused by leading election lawyers. 
More important than providing new mathematical support for this 
conventional wisdom, though, is providing a mathematical explanation for 
the persistent resistance to it. 
This resistance seems to be rooted in the admonition that recount 
challengers fight to recount most subgroups of votes that are expected to 
favor their opponents? This advice is counterintuitive to recount 
neophytes, but it is nevertheless correct. A principal objective of this 
Article is to explain and defend this counterintuitive requirement so that 
more candidates and lawyers embrace it. 
In doing so, they can avoid the fate that befell the most famous recount 
challenger in recent American history: AI Gore in the 2000 presidential 
election. Notwithstanding his slogan of "Count Every Vote,"3 Gore and his 
team sought only partial recounts.4 This strategy violated the mathematical 
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1 See TiMOTHY DOWNS ET AL., THE RECOUNT PRIMER 2 (1994). 
2 See irifra Part I. B. 
3 If every vote had been counted, Gore could have defeated George W. Bush. See Dennis Cauchon 
& Jim Drinkard, Florida Voter Errors Cost Gore the Election, USA TODAY, May II, 2001, at AI 
(showing that a statewide recount that included undervotes and overvotes offered Gore a significant 
possibility of victory). 
4 Gore's team actually argued in court against a more complete recount. See, e.g., JAKE TAPPER, 
141 
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and statistical precepts that this Article will illuminate, and even ran 
contrary to the advice of his own recount lawyers.5 While this math and 
advice may have been counterintuitive, Gore's resistance to them probably 
cost him the election.6 
Part I of this Article derives some elementary mathematical principles 
of optimal recount strategy and compares them to the conventional wisdom 
of recount experts. Part II applies this optimal strategy to the 2000 
presidential recount, looking only at what the parties knew or should have 
known at the time. It concludes that Al Gore's strategy was mathematically 
unsound in ways that required no hindsight to realize. Part III summarizes 
the discussion and offers concluding advice for would-be recount 
challengers and their lawyers. 
I. OPTIMAL RECOUNT STRATEGY 
Recount strategy starts with two very simple facts: (1) if an election is 
very close and you lost, you might want to seek a recount; and (2) if you 
are ahead, you will want to avoid one. Admittedly, these are not 
groundbreaking insights. 
More useful, but more complicated, is the math that emerges once other 
factors are introduced. The most important mathematical concept is 
uncertainty, which can also be expressed as variance (i.e., how widely 
spread out the range of possible outcomes is). This Part will examine 
variance and how it interacts with other factors in a recount. From that 
analysis, it will derive several principles of mathematically optimal recount 
strategy. After formulating these principles, this Part concludes by 
reconciling them with the conventional recount wisdom espoused in The 
DOWN AND DIRTY: THE PLOT TO STEAL THE PRESIDENCY 412, 414 (2001) (recounting David Boies's 
argument to Florida Supreme Court on behalf of Gore). 
5 See WASHINGTON POST, DEADLOCK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA's CLOSEST ELECTION 77-
78 (2001) (describing internal battle in Gore camp); TAPPER, supra note 4, at 66-68, 193-94; JEFFREY 
TOOBIN, TOO CLOSE TO CALL 37-39 (200 I). 
6 Gore's requested recounts would not have reversed the election result. See Amy Driscoll, Dade 
Undervotes Support Bush Win, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 26, 2001, at lA (reporting media analysis of 
undervotes in Miami-Dade County, the only Gore-requested recount not performed). For that matter, 
the statewide partial recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court--over Gore's objection-almost 
certainly would not have reversed the result, even if the United States Supreme Court had not 
intervened to stop it. See Dennis Cauchon, Newspapers' Recount Shows Bush Prevailed, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 4, 2001 (reporting media analysis of undervotes). See generally Steve Bickerstaff, Post-Election 
Legal Strategy in Florida: The Anatomy of Defeat and Victory, 34 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 149 (2002) 
(detailing Gore's strategic failures). Only a full count offered Gore any hope. See supra note 3. 
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Recount Primer, a definitive practical guide written by three top recount 
experts a few years before they worked in vain to help Al Gore. 
A. Underlying Assumptions 
Before digging into the mathematical muck, a few assumptions need to 
be set forth. First, this Article assumes that both the putative winner of an 
election (the "defender") and the putative loser (the "challenger") are 
rational actors who seek to maximize their net benefits. This means that 
challengers should seek a recount only when their benefit in doing so 
exceeds their costs. The assumption that people act rationally is widely 
used in economics and is highly contested-and justifiably so-but that 
does not undermine the notion that candidates should be rational here. 
While figuring out what counts as "costs" and "benefits" can get slippery, 
candidates surely should do what is best to achieve their goals, whatever 
those goals may be. 
Second, this Article assumes that the challenger is an "underdog" with 
less than a 50% chance of prevailing. Considering that recount challengers 
rarely win/ this assumption is reasonable enough. Challengers do 
sometimes get a better-than-50% chance of prevailing, and when that 
happens they may need to switch over to the strategies of a rational 
defender (and vice versa). When that happens in this Article, it will be 
noted and treated accordingly. 
The third and most crucial assumption is that the decision to pursue a 
recount entails multiple sub-decisions. In 2000, Florida had sixty-seven 
counties, for instance, each with its own independent election officials. But 
even in elections involving only one jurisdiction,8 there may be different 
levels of potential recounting to seek: singling out particular precincts; 
inspecting the counting machines; repeating the machine count; hand 
counting some ballots; hand counting all ballots; and so on. Where 
recounts are an ali-or-nothing proposition, there is not much strategy to 
consider beyond the non-groundbreaking insight that opened Part I: seek a 
recount if you lost narrowly. Where there is the potential to subdivide, 
7 See Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 159 (noting that recounts generally only change a handful of 
votes); Jim Drinkard, Fla. Results Unlikely to Change, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 2000, at 12A (making 
point more generally). 
8 Florida law passed in the wake of the 2000 recount now makes it much more likely that statewide 
races will have only statewide recounts. See FLA. STAT.§ 102.166(1) (2011). 
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though, challengers must consider separately whether to seek a recount for 
each individual component. That is where the math comes in. 
Fourth and finally, most of the factors considered in this Article cannot 
be quantified precisely. Some defy quantification because they are based 
on necessarily incomplete data-after all, the whole point of a recount is to 
search for information that is as yet unknown at some level. Other factors, 
like "political costs," defy precise quantification because they are not very 
tangible. Because perfect precision is impossible, a challenger cannot 
really use the principles derived in this Article to determine that, say, he or 
she would win a recount if it excludes all of County A except for Precinct 
B. This Article instead offers a framework for generally understanding how 
to maximize the chances of winning a recount. 
B. Challenger Strategy 
All other things being equal, a challenger's chances of winning a 
recount are maximized when uncertainty is maximized, which first and 
foremost means maximizing the number of votes being re-examined. In 
real recounts, however, all other things are not equal; sometimes 
challengers can expect a particular subset of votes to favor them or favor 
their opponents. But the effect of uncertainty is so significant that 
challengers should pursue groups of votes that they expect will favor their 
opponents, unless they are sufficiently certain about that result. 
Reaching these conclusions requires laying some groundwork. It also 
requires exploring certain nuances that the rest of this section will address. 
I. Basic Variables and Terminology 
As already mentioned, a challenger should seek a recount only if the 
benefit of doing so exceeds the cost. The challenger's most obvious benefit 
from seeking a recount is the possibility of reversing the election result. 
That can be expressed mathematically as the value of winning the recount 
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multiplied by the probability that the challenger will do so.9 Some other 
costs and benefits of recounts are discussed later. 10 
The probability that a recount will be successful (P) is a function of 
three variables. First, what is the defender's initial margin of victory (M)? 
Second, how many net virtual votes ( Vnet) will the recount produce for the 
challenger? Third, what is the chance that those virtual votes will be 
legally translated into actual votes (L)? 
A "virtual vote" (V) is one that is not reflected in the initial tally, but 
that potentially could be added in a recount. There are many forms that a 
virtual vote can take. A machine could fail to count a ballot in the initial 
count, but a reinspection would count it. The initial count could double-
count a ballot, and reinspection could correct this error. The initial count 
could reflect a simple tallying or recording error, which reinspection would 
undo. Ideally the recount will be more accurate than the initial count-
recounts tend to be slower, more deliberate, and more carefully 
scrutinized-but this is not necessarily so. Indeed, a virtual vote could also 
come from the second count introducing an error. 
Some virtual votes may favor the challenger ( Vchaflenger) and some the 
defender (Vdefender). To have a chance to reverse the election result, the 
challenger needs to find a net advantage among virtual votes (Vchaflenger -
Vdefenden or Vnet) that is greater than M II 
Just finding enough net virtual votes will not suffice for a challenger, 
though. Before it can actually be added to the tally, a virtual vote must be 
legitimized though some judicial or administrative action. Such legal 
actions do not occur automatically; the challenger's probability of finding 
enough net virtual votes must be discounted according to the probability 
that he or she will prevail in this legal process ("legal translation" or L). 
The Florida recount provides a striking example of this. While statisticians 
have established that the "butterfly ballot" in Palm Beach County almost 
9 Already we can derive a general principle of recount strategy. Because victory will almost 
certainly be a benefit (assuming that the challenger still wants to hold the office for which he or she 
was running) pursuing a recount will represent some benefit for the challenger however remote the 
probability of victory. After all, the alternative-no recount-has zero chance of delivering him or her 
the prize. If the challenger is to reject the idea of a recount, then, it will be because of some other part 
of the cost/benefit balance, not just because winning is a long shot. This helps explain why so many 
recounts are sought even though so few are successful. 
10 See infra Part 1.8.9. 
11 Challengers can also win when V"" equals M exactly, if they then win the tiebreaker. This pesky 
consideration will not prove significant in this Article. 
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certainly caused thousands of Gore voters to accidentally vote instead for 
Pat Buchanan, Gore knew that there was no way under the law to use that 
evidence to change the tally in his favor (L was very close to zero), and so 
he wisely did not try. 12 
2. Expected Value and Variance 
Although P is a function of M, Vner, and L, it can be understood more 
generally as relating to expected value and variance. In layperson's terms, 
a challenger's chance of winning a recount is a function of how he or she 
expects the recount to tum out, and how sure he or she is about that. 
Assuming (as this Article does) that the challenger is an underdog-that 
he or she will most likely lose the recount-then the expected value of a 
recount effort is less than M In the graph below, the portion of the area 
under the curve that is to the right of the vertical line at M (the "victory 
section") represents the challenger's probability of winning the recount: 
0 M 
Net votes picked up by challenger 
The effect of increasing expected value-moving the curve to the 
right-is obvious. The more votes the challenger can expect to net on 
average, the better his or her chances of winning the recount will be. 
Compare the first graph below (in which the expected value of the recount 
is zero13) with the second (in which the expected value is greater than 
zero): 
12 See TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 55, 200 (describing the Gore team's assessment of prospects 
regarding the butterfly ballot); Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 172-77 (describing butterfly ballot 
problems and the Gore team's response to it). 
13 The expected value is the average of all the possible results, weighted by probability. In the 
diagrams in this section the possibilities are symmetrical, so the expected value is not only the average, 
but also the median (middle) and mode (most likely). 
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In the second graph, the victory section is still less than 50% (the 
expected value, while positive now, is still less than M), but it is much 
greater than in the first graph. 
Increasing variance-making extreme results more likely, and so 
making the graph wider and flatter-helps the challenger as well. Compare 
the two graphs below, in which the total areas under the curves are the 
same and the expected values are the same, but the variances are different. 
In the first graph the variance and its square root, standard deviation, are 
lower than in the second graph: 
0 
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The victory section is larger in the second graph: increasing variance 
helps the challenger's odds even without any change to expected value. 
An important note: These graphs exhibit the classic bell curve that one 
gets from a "normal" distribution. A two-party race can be modeled with a 
binomial distribution, the same as would be used to graph how many coin 
flips out of a group came up heads. If the numbers are large enough, a 
binomial distribution will approximate a normal distribution. 14 As 
discussed later, though, binomial and normal distributions are not really the 
correct ones to use when thinking about recounts, a fact that makes a 
tremendous difference. 15 For now, bell curves will do to make the point 
that variance matters. 
The discussion that follows turns to other variables, but the impact of 
these other variables will always come from their effect on expected value 
or variance. 
3. Number of Votes 
Perhaps the simplest variables affecting P are the number of votes being 
re-examined (n) and the number of votes being changed (V). 
These are two very different numbers. A recount could examine 100 
ballots, but have only 5 votes that change upon re-examination: n equals 
100, V equals 5. Alternatively (though less commonly), the recount could 
focus on a precinct with 5 votes in it but "change" 100 of them when a 
cache of previously undiscovered ballots is found there: n equals 5, V 
equals 100. 16 This relationship can be expressed in terms of "yield," or the 
ratio between the number of virtual votes and the number of votes in 
question (VI n), but yield does not add much to the analysis as a variable 
separate from n and V. 17 
V is more directly significant than n, but it is also much harder to 
predict. Participants in a recount will always have a fairly accurate idea of 
how many ballots are being re-examined, but unless some recounting has 
already been done they can barely guess how many votes will actually 
14 See DAVID S. MOORE, THE BASIC PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 348 (2010) (discussing use of 
normal distribution to approximate binomial distribution). 
15 See infra Part 1.8.5. 
16 V can also be negative, such as when a recount discovers double counting in the original tally. 
17 Yield mainly just determines V from a known value of n. If we hold V constant (i.e., if we 
compare the two situations, nhigh · Y,o .. and n,o ... · Yhigh, where the products are equal), the expected value 
of the challenger's net gain in a recount will not change. The variance may change a bit, but the effect 
is quite small unless the virtual votes are skewed heavily to one candidate. 
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change. Still, generally, the more votes that are re-examined, the more 
votes will probably change. The higher n is, the higher V will probably be. 
An increase in n or V will increase variance and so, all other things 
being equal, a higher n or V means a higher P for the underdog challenger. 
In other words, the more votes that are re-examined or changed, the better 
the challenger's chances of winning the recount become. P will top out 
somewhere below 50% if we assume, as we are at this point, that any new 
votes are as likely to favor the challenger as the defender. When this 
assumption of balance is in place, the expected value of the recount will 
always be zero. Again, the gains here for the challenger from a higher n 
and V will come solely from the effect on variance, and the challenger will 
remain as the underdog. 
4. Disparateness 
Contrary to the assumption just discussed, we may not be able to 
assume that a virtual vote is equally likely to go to either side. To be sure, 
in many cases we will. There may be no data ex ante about the distribution 
of new votes, or the change in a recount may result from a clerical error 
and thus be equally likely to benefit either side. Additionally, if the only 
source of data is the original count-which in typicai recount situations 
will divide very close to 50-50-there will be near-symmetry if we assume 
that the new votes will divide between the candidates in the same 
proportion that the old votes did. 
Once more nuanced data are known about the votes being recounted, 
however, the chance that a virtual vote will favor the challenger may not be 
50-50. This requires consideration of disparateness (D): the probability 
that a virtual vote will go to the challenger as opposed to the defender. 
The expected value of a recount for the challenger is (2D- 1) · V. Using 
simple numbers as an example, if D is 60% and there are a hundred virtual 
votes, the challenger can expect to get sixty of them while the defender can 
expect to get forty, which means a net gain for the challenger of twenty 
votes: ((2 · 0.60) - 1) · 100. The formula also shows why the expected 
value of the recount was always zero when D equaled 50%; if D is 50%, 
then 2D- 1 is zero. 
When the expected value was zero, P still increased as n and V 
increased, but only because of their effect on variance. If D exceeds 50%, 
it is even more advantageous to the challenger to maximize n or V, because 
this will increase the expected value, too. If D is greater than 50%, (2D -
1) is positive, and the expected value of the recount will increase as n and 
V increase. If V gets high enough, the recount's expected value might even 
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exceed M, and the challenger will no longer even be an underdog. Of 
course, any time that the challenger attempts to cherry-pick subsets of 
recountable votes with a high D, the defender can try to stop that, or can do 
the same with low-D votes. 18 
The opposite effect occurs with those low-D (below 50%) votes: the 
challenger will have a negative expected value, and it will get lower as n 
and V increase. By analogy, consider whether your chances of beating Phil 
Mickelson at golf are better if you compete on just one hole or if you play 
seventy-two. While your chances of winning one hole are not good, they 
only get more dismal the longer you play. 
An interesting effect occurs when D is below, but fairly close to, 50%. 
In that case, not only will P decrease more slowly as n and V increase than 
it would if D were even lower, but P will also initially rise. This is because 
P is being pushed in two directions as n and V increase. Because D is 
below 50%, P is pushed downward by the decrease in expected value. At 
the same time, though, P is pushed upward by the increase in variance. 
When D is close to 50%, the effect of increased variance initially 
outweighs the effect of decreased expected value. 19 
18 The 2000 congressional race in the Eighth District of Michigan provides a perfect illustration. 
After a very close race, the putative loser, Dianne Byrum, asked for a recount in the counties where she 
had obtained the strongest support. The victor, Mike Rogers, requested a recount in all of the areas that 
Byrum had left out. He recognized that he would be taking a risk if he let Byrum carry out a one-sided 
recount. Although Rogers was confident of maintaining his lead, he was also confident that the areas 
that supported him in the first count would likely add votes to his column if there was a recount. 
(Michigan voting technology in 2000 was reliable enough that Rogers did not have to worry about 
increasing the variance of the recount all that much.) In the end, there was a full recount, with each 
candidate paying for the recount in the areas that favored him or her; Rogers won, but Byrum got a full 
recount and paid for only part of it. See Amy Franklin, State Canvassers CertifY Election Results; 
Byrum Asks for Recount, THE ARGUS-PRESS (Owosso, Mich.), Nov. 28, 2000, at AI (describing 
Byrum's and Rogers's initial recount requests); Recount Starts in 8th District, DET. FREE PRESS, Dec. 
5, 2000, at BI (describing recount process); David Poulson, Recount Adds Up for Rogers, GRAND 
RAPIDS PRESS, Dec. 16,2000, at AS, available at 2000 WLNR 7809736 (describing final result). 
19 For an illustration of how the effect works with a binomial distribution, assume that you are 
playing roulette. You bet one chip on Red every time for a I: I payoff (you either win a chip or lose a 
chip). Assume further that your goal is to net at least five chips, but that you must decide in advance 
how long you are going to play. Now consider the following graph: 
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This effect leads to a very important but counterintuitive conclusion: up 
to a certain point, it is to the challenger's advantage to seek to recount 
more votes, even when each new vote the recount finds is more likely to 
favor the defender. 
The question, of course, is where this "certain point" lies. That requires 
more analysis. For now, it is enough to say that recount participants need 
to consider variance and not just expected value. 
5. The Crucial Effect of Clustering 
The simple examples earlier in this Article were based on a binomial 
distribution, which assumes a series of binary events-like coin tosses, or 
spins of roulette-in which there is some fixed chance of "winning" each 
individual tum (like our variable D). Binomial variance equals the number 
of events (n), multiplied by D, multiplied by 1-D. 
If you flip a coin 10,000 times you would expect, on average, to get 
5,000 tails. The variance is 2,500 and the standard deviation (the square 
root of variance) is 50. If there are enough coin flips, the binomial 
distribution becomes very close to the normal distribution and its classic 
bell curve. About 68.8% of the time (versus 68.3% for a normal 
distribution), the result will be 5,000 ± 50 tails, and about 95.6% of the 
20 
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~ :c 10 
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Number of Spins 
If you play for too long your chances will keep declining. D works against you here, because your 
chances of winning each spin in roulette are only about 4 7.4% (eighteen of the thirty-eight spaces on 
the wheel are red). On the other hand, minimizing your number of spins doesn't help either; winning I 0 
or more times out of 15 spins (probability 10.8%) is less likely than winning 160+ out of 315 spins 
(probability 12.3%). You need to take enough chances to give yourself a nice-sized variance. The 
optimal number of spins is 75 or 77 (probability 17.9%). In a recount, the effect of variance (and thus 
the optimal number of chances to take) would be much larger than this; binomial distributions make for 
simple illustrations, but they understate the variance in recounts. See infra Part l.B.5. 
152 Journal of Law & Politics [Vol.XXX: 141 
time (95.5% for a normal distribution) it will be 5,000 ± 100 tails. Mildly 
extreme results are highly unlikely: getting more than 5,150 tails out of 
1 0,000-three standard deviations above the expected value-has a 
probability of only 0.13%. 
But voting and recounts are different from coin flips. We cannot assume 
that the plain binomial model is appropriate to determine variance, even if 
there is a fixed value for D. As an example, take a jurisdiction in which the 
challenger lost the initial count by only 20 votes out of 100,000, with no 
third-party candidates. Assume that a cache of 75 previously uncounted 
votes is discovered. Given that both candidates had essentially equal 
support (D equals 49.99%), we might presume ex ante that these new votes 
are essentially equally likely to go to either one of them, so that the 
challenger could expect to get 37.5 new votes (and no net votes). If we use 
the binomial model, the variance for this estimate would be 18.75, and the 
standard deviation would be 4.33. The challenger's chances of winning 
(getting at least 48 of the new votes, to the defender's 27) would be only 
1%, as he or she would need a result that is 2.42 standard deviations above 
the expected result. 
But now consider what would happen if these 75 new votes were all 
from the same precinct. Unless we know which precinct the votes are from, 
we probably cannot predict which candidate is likely to benefit more; the 
expected value of Vnet is still zero. The variance, however, will probably be 
larger. An extreme example makes this point clear. Assume that this 
jurisdiction comprises two very large and completely polarized precincts: 
one supports the defender 100% ( 50,010 to 0 in the initial count), and the 
other supports the challenger 100% (49,990 to 0 in the initial count). If we 
know that all of the votes came from one area or the other, then there is an 
almost 50% chance that they came from the challenger's turf. In such a 
case, even though the expected value-the average of our expectations-is 
still zero, P becomes 50%, obviously much higher than the previous 1% 
chance. Instead of having to do the equivalent of winning at least 48 out of 
75 coin flips, the challenger now just has to do the equivalent of winning 
one. 
To be sure, the "clustering" of new votes will rarely, if ever, be this 
stark. But anything that causes any sort of clustering will increase the 
probability of a more extreme result. Doubling the variance from the first 
example, from 18.75 to 37.5, increases P more than fourfold. 
Clustering seems inevitable in our example unless each precinct is a 
perfect microcosm of the entire jurisdiction. The odds of this occurrence 
are slim, however, given the numerous social and economic variables that 
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correlate with both voting preference and local geography. Moreover, 
ballots may be rejected for reasons that correlate with support for one 
candidate or the other. That is, one candidate may have supporters who are 
more likely to miscast a ballot in a certain way; this increases variance?0 
There is also the potential for clerical errors that transcend the one-vote-at-
a-time binomial model, such as transposing digits or mistaking a 6 for a 
1.21 Examples abound, and there will be plenty more when this Article 
turns to consider the Florida recount. In the abstract, though, without 
knowing the nature of these clusters in advance, we must assume that they 
are as likely to benefit one candidate as the other; once again, the expected 
value of Vnet remains at zero. But the potential for clustering exists and it 
raises the variance significantly. 
In fact, clustering might make the very concept of variance less salient, 
because clustering leads us away from thinking of a recount as a huge 
number of independent one-vote coin flips, and more toward thinking of it 
as a smaller number of interrelated, multi-vote determinations. In doing so, 
it takes us away from the tidy statistical realm of binomial and normal 
distributions, bell curves, and ultimately, away from the notion of being 
able to calculate or predict variance with any kind of precision. 
Some statisticians who analyze voting recognize the clustering effect-
with regard to regular voting, let alone the even-more-clumpy area of 
voting errors and recounts-and so they use overdispersed binomial 
distributions in their analyses, making their variances more than double 
what they would be with a regular binomial distribution.22 However, this 
20 The formula for combining the variance of A with the variance of 8 is (Variance A+ Variance 8 
+ (2 · Covariance of A & 8)). Covariance is the extent to which the results in the individual 
components are interlinked. If voters supporting one candidate might spoil their ballots in similar ways, 
it will thus make the total variance greater. The butterfly ballot is a perfect example; it affected Gore 
voters but not Bush voters, and thus led to a much larger anti-Gore error than anything neutral and 
random could ever have caused. See Jonathan N. Wand et al., The Bullerjly Did It: The Aberrant Vote 
for Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida, 95 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 793 (2001) (analyzing effect of 
butterfly ballot statistically). 
21 Just such an error reversed the presidential result in New Mexico in 2000. Gore's absentee vote 
total in one district was misread as 120 instead of 620. When that was corrected, Gore gained 500 
votes; he ended up winning the state by only 366. See Fritz Thompson, Cowchip Awards 2000, 
ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. I, 200 I, at A I, available at 200 I WLNR 2179971. 
22 See, e.g., Walter R. Mebane, Jr. & Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Robust Estimation and Outlier Detection 
for Overdispersed Multinomial Models of Count Data, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 392 (2004); Wand et al., 
supra note 20; Dennis Gilliland & Paul Meier, The Probability of Reversal in Contested Elections, in 
STATISTICS AND THE LAW 391, 398-99 (Morris H. DeGroot et al. eds., 1986). Some, however, have 
rejected its use. See, e.g., Michael 0. Finkelstein & Herbert E. Robbins, Mathematical Probability in 
Election Challenges, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 241 (1973); Herbert Robbins, Comment on 'The Probability 
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Article will not delve into more complicated statistical realms. There are 
currently no good ways to model rigorously the possible outcomes of a 
recount in which there are so many unknown factors. Sometimes caches of 
previously uncounted votes will be found; most of the time they will not. 
Often there will be errors in data entry or arithmetic that are not caught 
right away; often there will not be. Sometimes machine malfunctions will 
be uncovered; most of the time they will not. There will often be ballots 
that the machines missed but that manual examination will reveal to reflect 
a clear choice, and others for which manual examination will set up a 
dispute between the parties. But there are few good ways to predict the 
results of such recounting in advance. Even in cases in which partial 
recounts allow for projections to be made about their remainders, it is often 
difficult or impossible to be rigorous about calculating variance. In time, 
perhaps, researchers will generate enough data about various types of 
errors, various voting technologies, and the ways in which various political 
and demographic variables interact with them, that they will be able to 
make accurate forecasts of expected value and variance. But that time has 
not yet arrived, and pretending that it has only leads to false confidence 
and the accompanying errors. 
In any case, finding a model to predict precisely the expected value and 
variance of a recount is not necessary to make the point that the 
challenger's chances of success will be larger, often significantly larger, 
than the pure binomial model would suggest. Challengers must take care 
not to sell their chances short by underestimating the likelihood of 
seemingly extreme results-results that would be extreme were we 
flipping coins, that is.23 
Thus, to the point of the previous section-that challengers need to 
consider the variance, not just the expected value-we can add another: the 
variance may be quite a bit higher than they think. In the previous section, 
we saw that challengers should seek to recount votes even when doing so 
would reduce the expected value of a recount, so long as doing so would 
also raise the variance of that prediction by enough. When using normal 
distributions, "by enough" might not be very often,24 but once we reject the 
use of normal distributions it can be very often indeed. 
of Reversal in Contested Elections', in STATISTICS AND THE LAW, supra, at 412. 
23 See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN (2007) (investigating human 
tendency to underestimate the chances of seemingly improbable but highly consequential events). 
24 With some algebra and a little calculus (proofs on file with author), we can calculate that the 
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6. Reliability 
No known vote-counting system is perfect, and a challenger must try 
both to estimate the reliability of the initial count and to forecast the 
reliability of the recount. The number of virtual votes can be expressed in 
terms of the reliability of the counting systems. V equals: (1) miscounted 
votes from the first count; plus (2) miscounted votes in the second count; 
minus (3) votes that are miscounted the same way in both counts. To be 
sure, the term "reliability" may be a misnomer. The first (machine) count 
might consistently and appropriately exclude certain votes-say, those in 
which the voter made a clear mark but one that was not dark enough for 
the machine to pick up-while the second (hand) count might consistently 
and appropriately include them. Neither count was "unreliable" in the 
layperson's sense of the word, but such a situation will increase Vbecause 
the second count will defme all of those lightly marked votes as having 
been miscounted in the first count. 
Without knowing the expected relative effect of reliability (i.e., 
assuming that D equals 50%), we at least know that the lower reliability is, 
the higher V will be. The higher V is, the higher the variance in the 
predicted value of Vnet will be, thus improving the challenger's recount 
prospects (P). Thinking back to the three components of V in the last 
paragraph, then, challengers do better when the first count is unreliable 
(maximizing the first term), when the second count is unreliable 
(maximizing the second term), or when the reliability of the two counts is 
different (minimizing the third term, which is subtracted from the total). 
The first count will have been performed already, and so the challenger 
can only estimate its reliability and assess things accordingly; the more 
unreliable a first count was, the more apt a challenger should be to try to 
recount it. Regarding the second count, however, challengers have more 
control over the result. They can increase P in two ways. First, they can 
seek a recounting method that is as unreliable as possible. This strategy is 
not a promising one insofar as it will be difficult to make an effective 
public case for it; we presume that the defender will jump to contest it and 
that the authorities will be more reluctant to adopt it. 
The second method is more promising: seeking a recounting method 
that is as different from the initial method as possible, and so minimizing 
the number of votes miscounted the same way both times. This approach 
optimum n (i.e., the point at which P peaks) for a given M and D will be at or just below M/(1- 2D). 
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will be an easier case to make. Challengers can use democratic rhetoric 
about ensuring that every vote is counted, which means finding as many 
votes as possible that the first counting method missed, which in tum 
means using a different way of counting. The benefit to challengers' actual 
prospects, though, comes from the increase in Vnet and its variance, not 
from satisfying the public's democratic impulses. 
7. Legal Probability 
The final factor affecting P is L, the probability of turning virtual votes 
into actual votes through the legal process. This entails both obtaining a 
recount and defming its bounds. It may also encompass litigation in 
administrative, trial, and appellate tribunals. While legal probability is very 
difficult to estimate precisely, lawyers are used to at least attempting to 
make such calculations, usually out of necessity?5 If a recount is pursued, 
there may be disagreement over which votes count as legal votes-the 
challenger may wish to count certain types of marks as votes, while the 
defender does not. When challengers lose such legal arguments, P drops. 
Mathematically, L can either interact with Vnet directly to determine P, 
or it can interact with discrete groups of votes to discount Vnet· As an 
example of the former, assume that the challenger's recount strategy offers 
a 70% chance of yielding a Vnet greater than M, but that implementing that 
strategy requires winning a difficult legal argument with only a 10% 
chance of success. In such a situation, P equals [L · p(Vnet > M)], or 7%. 
In the latter situation, separate legal probabilities can be used to 
discount predicted gains in discrete subcategories of recounted votes. If L 
equals 10% for a cache of votes in which Vnet equals 50, and is 20% for an 
independent cache where Vnet equals 40, then the total expected value of 
the two caches is 13 votes (5 + 8). By aggregating all of the individual 
expected values (and their variances), the challenger can assess a final 
aggregate value of P (and its associated variance)?6 
25 A common example is deciding whether to accept a settlement or proceed to trial, which requires 
forecasting both the probability and likely magnitude of a victory at trial. See generally Maljorie Anne 
McDiarmid, Lawyer Decision Making: The Problem of Prediction, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1847. 
26 Aggregating variance requires considering covariance-the extent to which individual 
components vary in unison with each other. See supra note 20. 
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8. Summary of Probability 
Statistically, the probability of a recount altering the election result (P) 
can be expressed as a function of the number of votes being re-examined 
(n), the gross and net number of "virtual" votes that are expected to change 
(V and Vner), the defender's initial margin of victory (M), the likelihood of 
each virtual vote being for the challenger as opposed to the defender (D), 
and the legal probability of translating the virtual votes into actual votes 
(L). 
Through their effect on the expected value of a recount and the variance 
associated with that expectation, most of these factors will increase P as 
they themselves increase. Increasing Vner, D, and L will boost the expected 
value of the recount. Increasing n and V will increase variance, and 
therefore generally increase P-often even when D is less than 50%. 
Variance will be significantly higher than that suggested by a simple 
binomial (coin flip) model, because of the potential "clustering" of new 
votes. 
The challenger can also increase V by obtaining recounting methods 
that are as different from the initial counting method as possible. 
Obviously, the last remaining variable, M, will decrease P as it increases; 
the farther behind challengers start out, the lower their chances are of 
winning a recount. 
9. Other Benefits and Costs 
So far in this Article, the only benefit of a recount for the challenger 
discussed is that it might reverse the election result, and costs have largely 
been ignored. A recount may offer other benefits, however, and will 
present costs as well. 
One benefit is that a recount, even if unsuccessful for the challenger, 
may have emotional "process value." That is, it may make challengers and 
their supporters feel better about losing-as opposed to the ill feeling of 
helpless surrender, or the nagging sense that they might have won had the 
votes been re-examined. There may also be political value in seeking a 
recount; a candidate might wish to fight for accuracy and efficiency in the 
electoral process, consistent with a platform of honest and efficient 
governance. A candidate might also wish to highlight systematic 
imbalances in the errors in the first count, consistent with a platform of 
equal rights and justice. (In the latter two cases, this political value might 
be satisfied largely by the challenger making those arguments rather than 
actually winning them.) 
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Recounts entail costs as well. In some situations under certain state 
statutes, a challenger must front the administrative costs incurred by 
election officials.27 Additionally, sponsoring the lawyers and other 
partisans who represent the challenger on the ground is also potentially 
expensive. There may also be political costs. If the recount fails, the 
challenger may jettison a politically lucrative perception that he or she was 
the true winner. Win or lose, the request may give him or her a reputation 
as a sore loser or a cheater; it may be better to appear (publicly) high-
minded, concede defeat, and try again next time.28 The less likely the 
challenger is to win, the higher these costs will be. 
Partial recounts may affect other costs and benefits as well. The 
additional legal argument and effort needed to distinguish and subdivide a 
mass of votes may exceed the savings from the smaller counting effort. In 
terms of political costs, a less-than-complete count may sacrifice the moral 
high ground, and could fuel a perception that a challenger is engaging in 
unseemly strategic behavior. 
These sorts of calculations will vary among the infinite possible factual 
contexts, so attempting to be systematic about them, let alone to quantify 
them, is pointless in a venue such as this. Nevertheless, it seems that a 
challenger will typically have much more to gain than to lose. In an age of 
short voter memory, the high stakes of a political race almost certainly 
ensure that the benefit of winning a recount will exceed the net cost of 
making the attempt, so long as the challenger has a real chance of reversing 
the election result. It might hurt to be called a sore loser or a cheat, but 
winning a recount and taking office would tend to take a lot of the sting out 
of it.29 
C. Defenders 
This Article has not considered defenders so far, for the simple reason 
that defenders will rarely want to sacrifice the 100% chance of winning 
27 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 168.881(1) (West 2005). 
28 See TAPPER, supra note 4, at 93 (discussing Nixon's decision not to contest the 1960 presidential 
election); Chris Cillizza, Losing by a Hair, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, June I, 2005, at 21 (discussing 
other such candidates). 
29 Gore apparently remarked, when rejecting his aides' advice to challenge questionable military 
absentee ballots, "If I won this thing by a handful of military ballots, I would be hounded by 
Republicans and the press every day of my presidency and it wouldn't be worth having." David 
Barstow & Don VanNatta Jr., How Bush Took Florida; Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 15,2001, at I. One wonders if Gore still felt that way in 2004 or 2008. 
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they would have in the absence of a recount. However, defenders may not 
succeed in preventing a recount, and thus may need to bolster their position 
or even plan as if they are the underdogs. Conversely, challengers may 
have such a good chance of prevailing that they essentially become 
defenders. 
The flip side of the challenger's strategy-a challenger should seek to 
add a group of votes to a recount when doing so will increase expected 
value or when it will decrease expected value but provide a large enough 
increase in variance-is that a defender should seek to recount a group of 
votes only when doing so will increase expected value and avoid much of 
an increase in variance. A defender who is reasonably certain of winning 
thus will not want to choose any recount options unless their expected 
value to him or her is positive (or close to it) and their variance is low. 
Thus, a defender should fight to keep Vner. D, and L low, and obtain 
recounting methods that are as close to the initial counting method as 
possible. 
In summary, challengers should seek to recount even those votes they 
expect to cut against them, so long as that expectation is sufficiently 
uncertain. Defenders should seek to avoid recounting even those votes they 
expect to favor them, unless that expectation is sufficiently certain. 
If ever a defender feels that he or she is more likely than not to lose, 
however, then he or she is in the same position as an underdog challenger, 
and should seek additional recount options with positive expected values 
or high variances. 
D. Tim Downs and The Recount Primer 
The Recount Primer (the "Primer")30 is a book by Democratic recount 
experts Timothy Downs, Chris Sautter, and John Hardin Young. The three 
worked for Gore during the recount, and they brought the book with them 
to help train Gore operatives as they flew to Florida after Election Night to 
fight for their candidate. 31 In their lengthy careers, the authors had fought 
recount battles both as challengers and defenders; the strategies set out in 
the Primer were just as valuable for Republicans as for Democrats in 2000. 
The book is filled with valuable advice about effectively managing the nuts 
and bolts of actual recounts. It also provides the conventional wisdom on 
30 DOWNS ET AL., supra note I. 
31 See TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 28. 
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strategy. That conventional wisdom is consistent with the mathematical 
principles in this Article. 
The Primer says that for defenders, "the scope of the recount should be 
as narrow as possible, and the rules and procedures of the recount should 
be the same as those used election night."32 To recount as little as possible 
is, as this Article puts it, to minimize n and V. 33 To use standards as close 
to those used in the first count is to maximize reliability. 34 
The Primer's strategy for challengers tracks the mathematical principles 
of this paper as well: "If a candidate is behind, the scope should be as 
broad as possible, and the rules for the recount should be different from 
those used election night."35 This rule maximizes n and V and minimizes 
reliability. 
Elaborating on the idea of recounting as broadly as possible, Downs 
clarified later that a challenger should exclude only those votes for which 
there are concrete facts to indicate that a recount will cause a drop in votes 
(unfavorable expected value and low variance).36 Downs did not say to 
avoid recounting votes that challengers think will hurt them, but only to 
avoid recounting those that they fairly know will hurt them. If the variance 
of the predicted results of a group of votes is high enough, merely thinking 
that they probably lose votes for the challenger is not enough of a reason to 
avoid recounting them. Moreover, as discussed above, variance will often 
be much higher than simple binomial models might suggest/7 giving the 
challenger a reason to assume a higher variance and err on the side of 
including more votes in a recount. 
II. THE FLORIDA 2000 RECOUNT 
This Part of the Article will briefly summarize what happened in the 
2000 Florida recount, putting some of it in terms of the variables discussed 
in the last section. It will then analyze how the choices made by AI Gore's 
team (and to a lesser extent, George W. Bush's) compare to the optimal 
strategy. 
32 DOWNS ET AL., supra note I, at 5. 
33 See supra Part 1.8.3. 
34 See supra Part 1.8.6. 
35 DOWNS ET AL., supra note I, at 5. 
36 Timothy Downs, Tim Downs Tells about Recent Recount Efforts in Florida, INGHAM COUNTY 
BAR BRIEFS, Feb. 2001, at I. 
37 See supra Part 1.8.5. 
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A. What Happenecf8 
1. The First Count and the Automatic Recount 
On election night, November 7, major media outlets initially called 
Florida for Al Gore. Then they retracted that, classifying it as too close to 
call. In the wee hours of the following morning, the media called Florida-
and with it the presidency-for George W. Bush. Then they retracted that, 
classifying Florida once more as too close to call. It would remain so for 
more than a month.39 
The first set of complete returns announced on November 8 showed 
George W. Bush with 2,909,135 votes to AI Gore's 2,907,351. Other 
candidates received about 138,000 votes. An additional group of almost 
180,000 votes, an embarrassing 3% of the total, went to nobody, at least as 
far as the machines performing the first count were concerned. This 
included both invalid "undervotes" on which the machines detected no 
choice, and invalid "overvotes" on which the machines detected more than 
one choice. Bush's lead-1,784 votes, or 0.03%-was a mere hundredth of 
this number of rejected ballots. (An Appendix with a complete reckoning 
of the county and state totals at each stage of the process, and a count of 
rejected ballots, appears at the end of this Article.) 
In any race decided by a margin of less than 0.5%, Florida law provided 
for a state-wide automatic recount.40 Six days of recounting shrunk Bush's 
lead considerably. That result exemplified the "clustering effect" discussed 
in Part I.B.5; although the automatic recount caused thousands of votes to 
change, the net changes were +1,357 for Bush and +2,841 for Gore-a 
pro-Gore ratio that would have been unthinkable if this had been the result 
of independently flipping 4,200 coins rather than re-examining millions of 
votes.41 
There were multiple "clusters" at play. In 2000, each Florida county 
chose its own voting method and had independent discretion over how to 
38 For the sake of convenience, this Article cites to a small subset of sources to document the 
events of the recount: TAPPER, supra note 4; TOOBIN, supra note 5; and Bickerstaff, supra note 6. The 
events of the recount are so well documented, however, that there are numerous other worthy sources 
that could have been cited instead. Also, some of the footnotes in this section will come at the end of a 
paragraph and cover the entire paragraph, in lieu of having numerous identical citations for each 
sentence. 
39 See TOO BIN, supra note 5, at 18-20 (initial calls); TAPPER, supra note 4, at 39 (final retraction). 
4° FLA. STAT.§ 102.141(4) (2000) (current amended version at FLA. STAT.§ 102.141(7) (2014)). 
41 See Joe Follick, Power of Discretion, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 15, 2000, at I, available at 2000 
WLNR 622276 (providing automatic-recount vote change totals). 
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interpret the automatic recount law. Practices varied. Some counties did 
not touch their ballots and just checked their equipment and re-tallied the 
precinct-level numbers.42 Most of these counties showed insignificant 
changes, if any, although Bush picked up over 100 net votes in Martin43 
when a transcription error there was corrected.44 
Other counties ran every ballot back through the tabulating machines. 45 
This method changed the totals in some counties substantially, most 
sizably when groups of ballots were discovered to have been misplaced or 
double-counted in the initial tally. This phenomenon provided a huge gain 
to Gore-and yet another one that would have been staggeringly 
improbable without the clustering effect. For example, Gore won big when 
previously uncounted or double-counted votes were straightened out in 
Palm Beach (Gore 510, Bush 99),46 and Pinellas (Gore 417, Bush -61 ),47 
while Bush had smaller such gains in Polk (net for Bush of 90), Seminole 
(98), and Volusia (58).48 
Changes in the automatic recount in punch-card counties were also 
attributed to falling chads: loose pieces of chad that fell off of punch cards 
between the first and second counts, causing some ballots to go from being 
undervotes to actual votes, and others to go from actual votes to 
overvotes.49 In some places, however, the changes favored Gore so 
42 TOO BIN, supra note 5, at 66 (decrying failure of some counties to actually recount ballots); Lisa 
Getter, Ballot Recount: Many Things to Many People, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at I (describing 
variation in county practices for automatic recount). 
43 To be more concise, I will refer to all Florida counties only by their name (e.g., "Martin" rather 
than "Martin County"). 
44 See Melissa E. Holsman, Gore Narrows Lead, STUART NEWS (Stuart, Fla.), Nov. 10, 2000, at 
A I, available at 2000 WLNR 7606774 (describing corrections of errors in Martin County). 
45 See Getter, supra note 42 (describing variation in county practices for automatic recount). 
46 This total is based on my own analysis of the precinct-by-precinct results in the initial count and 
the automatic recount, obtained from Palm Beach County, and a phone conversation on July 5, 2001, 
with Theresa LePore, Supervisor of Elections for Palm Beach County. Precinct 29E was overlooked on 
election night; when added in it went 368-23 for Gore. According to LePore, Precinct A038, a 
grouping of absentee ballots, found a similarly overlooked cache. When counted, it favored Gore 142-
76. 
47 See Rob Shaw, More Than 2,000 Votes Mishandled in Pinellas, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 10, 2000, at 
12, available at2000 WLNR 666290 (describing non-counting of 1,326 ballots and double counting of 
739 others). While the biggest changes came from these corrections, there were likely other smaller 
changes as well. 
48 TAPPER, supra note 4, at 141, 143 (discussing Bush gains in Polk, Seminole, and Volusia from 
fixing double-counted precincts). The totals for each county, which are listed in the Appendix, reflect 
other changes as well. 
49 See Seth Borenstein, On "Chads," Recounts and Ballots, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. II, 2000, at 
Al9, available at2000 WLNR 2438546 (discussing falling chad phenomenon). 
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disproportionately that they cannot have come from such a random 
phenomenon. In Palm Beach, for instance, Gore had a 277-6 advantage in 
new votes other than those from the discovery of large groups of 
previously uncounted votes-the product of separate, slight changes spread 
over hundreds of precincts.50 In Duval, a county that Bush had won on 
election night, Gore won 184-16 among the new votes. 51 The odds of such 
results arising out of a series of individual, random, independent changes 
are preposterously small. Some phenomena other than falling chads must 
have been at play. 52 
Some counties that used scan ballots used the automatic recount as an 
opportunity to do hand counting. 53 For instance, Gore netted 64 votes 
(1 05-41) in Orange when county officials, examining ballots by hand, 
50 Subtracting the changes from the two precincts with previously uncounted votes from the total 
change from the automatic recount of787 for Gore and 105 for Bush yields the 277-6 figure. See supra 
note 46. There may also have been double counting in Precinct 194, which changed -II for Gore and -4 
for Bush; if so, that would make the total 288-10, a less stark but still very unbalanced number. In my 
conversation with her on July 5, 2001, Palm Beach Supervisor of Elections Theresa LePore had no 
explanation for the fact that the numerous small changes in hundreds of precincts favored Gore so 
heavily. Gore lost ground in a total of 17 precincts, Bush in 39. Gore gained in 168; Bush in 46. Gore 
broke even in 453; Bush in 563. 
51 See E-mail from Dick Carlberg, Duval County Assistant Supervisor of Elections, to author (May 
23, 2001) (on file with author) ("The additional votes for Bush and Gore were most likely due to chad 
falling off partially punched holes. In recounts this is the norm. Valid votes for all candidates tend to 
increase, undervotes decrease, and overvotes increase. I don't know why the gain heavily favored 
Gore."). The changes in vote totals from the automatic recount are detailed in the Appendix. 
52 Some rough calculations show just how clear the numbers are here. Assume that the only thing 
happening here is that the chad on the ballots was punched such that it was intact the first time through 
the machine, but was gone the second time through. Assume further that there is nothing making a 
Gore voter more likely than a Bush voter to punch the chad this way. At the county level, this would 
mean that if Gore won X% of the county-wide vote in the initial count, a new vote from falling chad 
would have an X% probability of being for Gore. 
In Palm Beach, Gore won 63.814% of the two-party vote in the initial count. There were 283 new 
votes supposedly from falling chad. The probability of winning 277 (as Gore did) or more out of 283, 
when the probability of winning each one was 63.814%, is less than 
0.000000000000000000000000000002%. Even if Gore had won 95% of the two-party vote in the 
initial count, the chances of a pickup that lopsided would have been only about 1%. Gore's pickup in 
Duval was less lopsided at 184-16, but he had won just 41.474% of the two-party vote in the initial 
count there. The probability of a 184-16 pickup from falling chad, when the probability for each vote 
was 41.474%, is 0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000335%. In other words, the 
assumptions that began this exercise can safely be rejected. These new votes for Gore were due to 
something other than random fluctuations of chad. Just exactly what remains unclear to this day. 
Falling chad also cannot explain changes like that in Palm Beach Precinct 137, to take just one 
weird example among many, many of them. In the automatic recount, one more ballot was counted 
than in the initial count. Bush's total dropped by two, and the totals for Gore, Harry Browne, and 
undervotes each rose by one. Falling chad cannot account for that. 
53 See, e.g., TAPPER, supra note 4, at 72 (describing events in Gadsden). 
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added votes where the voter (apparently taking the phrase "write in" as a 
command) had chosen a candidate and then re-voted for the same 
candidate as a write-in.54 These "redundant write-ins" were rejected by the 
machines as impermissible "overvotes," but officials included them as 
evincing clear intent. Officials in Gadsden found 187 clear-intent but 
machine-rejected ballots, mostly overvotes such as redundant write-ins; 
they favored Gore 170-17, netting him 153 votes. 55 Once again, Gore won 
tremendously disproportionate gains among these new votes because his 
supporters were apparently more likely to make this particular error. Gore 
won Orange County by only 50% to 48%, but the redundant write-ins 
favored him 72% to 28%. Gadsden went for Gore by 66% to 32%, a far cry 
from the 10: 1 advantage he enjoyed among the new votes there. 
As a result of all this, the automatic recount helped Gore considerably. 
By Thursday, Bush's lead had apparently shrunk to 327 votes.56 Volusia 
County's counting process was so confused that Gore asked for and 
received a full hand recount there. 57 By November 14, after other counties 
updated their numbers and Volusia finished its recount, Bush's lead was 
down to 300 votes.58 
B. The Protest Phase 
Florida law offered a confusing tangle of recount procedures subject to 
varying interpretation. The Bush legal position, supported in large part by 
Florida's Republican Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, portrayed the 
law as providing a relatively simple process that made it unlikely that 
many votes would be recounted beyond the automatic recount: After 
election night, each party had three days to "protest" the count in each 
county by showing significant problems with the county's voting 
machinery or the arithmetic of its election workers. Each county would 
decide for itself whether and how to perform a hand recount. The results 
from each county would have to be certified on November 14. Because of 
a settlement in a federal lawsuit, absentee votes from overseas could come 
54 Scott Maxwell & David Damron, Now Democrats Are Upset with the Way Lake Counted, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 14,2000, at Al3 (describing Orange debacle). 
55 Mary Ellen Klas, N. Florida County Tries to Fill in Blanks on Ballots, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 
10, 2000, at 16A (describing Gadsden process). This characterization of the Gadsden recount is also 
based on a discussion I had with Gadsden Supervisor of Elections Shirley Knight in May 200 I. 
56 See TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 67. 
51 See id. at 38-39, 83. 
58 See TAPPER, supra note 4, at 183. 
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in until November 17; when they had, the final results would be submitted 
to Harris, who would certify a winner. Once the winner was certified, the 
loser could "contest" the result in a single unified proceeding. The winner 
after that would get all of the state's 25 electoral votes. 59 
The Gore legal position differed in two important respects. First, Gore 
argued that counties should conduct hand recounts if the machines, even if 
working as intended, had nevertheless rejected a significant number of 
votes. On this basis, Gore "protested" and asked on November 9 for hand 
recounts in Broward, Miami-Dade, and Palm Beach.60 These counties-the 
"Big 3"-represented over a third of his votes in the initial count, and were 
three of the four counties with the largest absolute number of rejected 
ballots. (The fourth, Duval, was carried by Bush, 57% to 41%.) 
Second, because the November 14 deadline imposed by Harris would 
have made it difficult or impossible for the Big 3 to complete their hand 
recounts on time, Gore argued in court that there really was no November 
14 deadline for protest recounts to conclude.61 While the three counties 
debated how to proceed and the courts wrestled with the deadline question, 
Gore made his only gesture-a halfhearted one-toward actually counting 
every vote. In a nationally televised address, Gore continued to press for 
hand recounts only in the Big 3, but said that "if Governor Bush prefers," 
Gore would abide by the results of a statewide hand recount. 62 
Unsurprisingly, Bush did not prefer a statewide recount, and Gore never 
asked any Florida officials for one-they, not Bush, were the proper forum 
for such a request. 
Eventually, the Florida Supreme Court extended the protest recount 
deadline to November 26, giving the Big 3 more time to recount.63 In 
obtaining this extension, however, Gore essentially conceded that 
December 12 was the deadline for fmishing the "contest" phase, which 
would later make the contest proceedings rushed and more difficult.64 
59 For a summary of Bush's interpretation of the law, see Lynne H. Rambo, The Lawyers' Role in 
Selecting the President: A Complete Legal History of the 2000 Election, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 
I 05, 177-82 (2002). 
60 For a summary of Gore's interpretation of the law, see id. at 174-76. The final decision to focus 
on the Big 3 (plus Volusia) is described in TAPPER, supra note 4, at 68. 
61 See Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 183. 
62 TAPPER, supra note 4, at 190. 
63 Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1240 (Fla. 2000). 
64 TAPPER, supra note 4, at 233; TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 134; Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 199. 
Under federal law (3 U.S.C. § 5), a state's result is presumptively valid if it is reached by December 12 
and according to pre-existing state law. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (in force in 2000 election). If not, 
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Broward completed its recount on time, netting Gore 567 votes.65 Palm 
Beach fell ninety minutes short of finishing its recount by 5 p.m. on the 
26th and so Harris did not accept its new numbers (Palm Beach's haste 
meant that the would-be results-176 net votes for Gore-were not known 
for a few days and remained disputed).66 Miami-Dade had begun a hand 
recount, but got through only about one-sixth of the ballots before it 
concluded that it could not finish in time and stopped. Gore's gain in 
Miami-Dade's partial count was 168.67 
Unfortunately for Gore, the 567 net votes from Broward were not 
enough to overcome Bush's lead, which had grown from 300 to 930 on 
November 18 after the late overseas absentee ballots were added in.68 
Additionally, several other counties took advantage of the November 26 
extension to adjust their totals. First, Bush netted 51 votes when Nassau 
County, having discovered that it omitted a group of votes in the automatic 
recount, reverted to the prior, more inclusive count.69 Second, Bush's team 
made a special effort (discussed in more detail later70) to have several 
counties reconsider overseas absentee ballots that it had rejected for things 
like missing postmarks; that initiative netted Bush over a hundred more net 
votes. Harris thus certified Bush's lead on November 26 at 537 votes.71 
C. The Contest 
Having been certified the loser, Gore contested the result, seeking five 
separate actions: 
(1) Nassau to return to its second, smaller count. Net gain: 51.72 
(2) The tardy Palm Beach results to be included. Net gain: either 176 or 
215.73 
Congress would have been allowed to question and reject the state's electoral votes much more easily 
when it tallied them in January. 
65 See TAPPER, supra note 4, at 3 15. 
66 See Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 186 & n.l52. 
67 See id. at 187-88 (describing Miami-Dade experience). 
68 See TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 124. 
69 See TAPPER, supra note 4, at 308. 
70 See infra text accompanying notes 102-05. 
71 See TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 189. A full reckoning of these changes appears in the Appendix. 
72 See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2000) (reciting Gore's claims), rev'd sub nom. 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
73 See id. at 1248 (reciting Gore's claims). Bush claimed the true number was 176. See id. at 1248 
n.6. Gore claimed it was 215 and the county canvassing board reported the number as 174. See Brad 
Hahn, Yo-Yo Totals Cause ConfUsion In All, Four Totals Surface For Gore, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-
SENTINEL, Dec. 10, 2000, at !SA, available at 2000 WLNR 8527331 (describing confusion over 
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(3) The partial Miami-Dade recount to be included. Net gain: 168.74 
(4) The rest of Miami-Dade's "undervotes" to be hand counted. Rather 
than examine all 512,790 of the ballots left out of the aborted hand recount, 
Gore wanted to speed things along by focusing just on the 9,000-or-so 
undervotes. Gore estimated to the court that this count would net him 600 
votes.75 
(5) The Palm Beach recount standards to be expanded to include so-
called dimpled chad (punch card ballots in which a selection had been 
dimpled but not detached from any comers). Palm Beach had counted 
dimples only in the rare case where the voter had left similar dimples for 
other races on the ballot. If the court used the more lenient standard to 
count the Palm Beach ballots, Gore argued, he would net 800 more votes 
there.76 
The trial court rejected all of Gore's claims, and Gore appealed. The 
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of Gore's first (Nassau) and 
fifth (Palm Beach dimples) claims, but it reversed the trial court on the 
other three. It ordered the inclusion of Palm Beach's net 17 6 or 215 votes 
(directing the lower court to find the proper number) and the 168 net votes 
from the partial Miami-Dade count. This dropped Bush's lead down to 154 
or 193 votes. It also ordered that the undervotes in the remainder of Miami-
Dade be hand counted. 77 
If the Florida Supreme Court had stopped there, things would have been 
very different. First of all, Gore would have lost, and lost quickly. The 
remainder of Miami-Dade held no hope for Gore; as discussed later, his 
estimate to the court that it would yield him many votes, let alone 600 of 
them, was fanciful. 78 
Second and more significant, though, the Florida Supreme Court 
ordered a recount that Gore had not sought-that his lawyers had in fact 
argued againse9-but that was more along the lines of Gore's "Count 
various counts in Palm Beach). The courts and parties, however, seem to have ignored the 174 figure. 
74 See Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1248 (reciting Gore's claims). 
75 See Complaint to Contest Election at 4, Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000), available at http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/election/CV-00-2808a.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2014), rev 'd, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev 'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000). 
76 See id. at 3-4. 
77 Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1258-61. 
78 See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
79 See, e.g., TAPPER, supra note 4, at 412, 414 (recounting David Boies's argument to Florida 
Supreme Court on behalf of Gore). 
168 Journal of Law & Politics [Vol.XXX:l41 
Every Vote" slogan. The court ordered hand counting of all of the 
undervotes in the entire state not already counted (i.e., excluding Volusia, 
Broward, Palm Beach, and one-sixth ofMiami-Dade).80 
The counties began separating out and counting their undervotes. Some 
were apparently going to reexamine overvotes as well. 81 However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court stopped them on grounds that the lack of a single statewide 
standard for interpreting ambiguous votes was unconstitutional.82 With 
further recounts off the table, Gore conceded and Bush's victory was 
finalized at a 537-vote margin.83 
D. Assessing Gore's and Bush's Strategies 
This section applies the precepts of optimal recount strategy developed 
in Part I to the facts on the ground in the Florida recount set out in Part II, 
sections A-C. Put another way, it describes in mathematical terms where 
Gore went wrong. 
1. The Automatic Recount 
As discussed above,84 Florida Statutes § 102.141(4) provided for a 
state-wide automatic recount in any race decided by a margin of less than 
0.5%, and the margin the morning after the election was only 0.03%. The 
statute did allow the losing candidate to request otherwise, 85 but Gore 
made the obvious and correct call by declining to do so. 
The automatic recount produced gains that sharply favored Gore, but it 
produced an even greater benefit for him for later use: information. Gore's 
team may have been impressed by the huge and disproportionate gains 
they won in the punch-card counties, 86 but they should have also taken note 
of the significant and disproportionate gains they won from other sources, 
like redundant write-ins and other overvotes. This information was neither 
secret nor obscure. Orange and Gadsden demonstrated in the first days of 
80 Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1262. 
81 See 67 Counties 67 Recounts, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at 6x, available at 2001 
WLNR 11081956 (listing nine counties that indicated they would have counted overvotes). 
82 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). 
83 See TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 268-70 (recounting Gore's concession). 
84 See supra Part li.A.l. 
85 The statute provided that "[a] recount need not be ordered with respect to the returns for any 
office, however, if the candidate or candidates defeated or eliminated from contention for such 
office ... request in writing that a recount not be made." FLA. STAT. § 102.141(4) (2000) (current, 
amended version at FLA. STAT.§ 102.141(7) (2014)). 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 50-52. 
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this whole drama that scan ballots and overvotes in counties outside the 
Big 3 were a potentially rich source of new net votes for Gore.87 Gore's 
team knew it but did not want to take the risk and decided to focus instead 
on punch cards in the Big 3.88 
2. The Protest Phase 
Even before the automatic recount concluded, Gore needed to decide on 
a strategy for the protest phase. He considered three such strategies, each 
promoted by a different faction among his advisers.89 One option was to try 
to protest the results in all sixty-seven counties and thereby obtain what 
would amount to a statewide hand recount. This choice was pushed by the 
Gore team's recount veterans, Tim Downs, Chris Sautter, and John Hardin 
Young, the authors of The Recount Primer. Their strategy (in terms that 
this Article has used) was to seek out the highest possible n and V, and 
highest possible variance, and then let the chips fall where they may. Not 
only would this have been the sensible choice from the standpoint of the 
mathematics of recounting, it also would have tracked Gore's slogan of 
"Count Every Vote." 
Others on the Gore team disagreed. The protest procedure was 
decentralized. As such, a siatewide recount would have meant making 
sixty-seven separate and possibly unsuccessful recount requests, and 
fighting legal battles in sixty-seven different courts. A better alternative, 
they argued, was to skip the protest phase and go quickly to the centralized 
contest procedure, where a comprehensive statewide recount would be 
easier to manage. A statewide recount, even a delayed one, would provide 
a high n, V, and variance, and would have been consistent with a slogan of 
"Count Every Vote." 
A third faction rejected the idea of a statewide recount altogether. Time 
was of the essence, and political standing was as important in the short 
term-to this faction anyway-as any abstract strategy. Therefore, this 
faction argued in favor of limited recounts, in those counties that the 
sketchy data available showed as offering the best chance to quickly add 
87 See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. 
88 See TAPPER, supra note 4, at 184-85 (describing deliberations); see also id. at 134 (describing 
Gore's recount expert Jack Young handling redundant write-ins in Volusia recount). 
89 The contents of these deliberations have been widely reported. See, e.g., WASHINGTON POST, 
supra note 5, at 77-79; TAPPER, supra note 4, at 66--68; TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 37-39. These sources 
provide support for the descriptions in this paragraph and the two that follow. 
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votes to Gore's column. Gore would not be able to continue a recount 
effort without political support, they argued, for which he would require 
rapid and substantial gains from a focused attack rather than a scattershot 
one. This group thus sought to maximize D at the expense of higher n, V, 
and variance. 
Ultimately, the third faction won Gore over. Indeed, throughout the 
recount, Gore favored his political advisors over his recount experts. 90 
Following the third faction's advice, Gore sought hand recounts just in 
Volusia and the Big 3 (Broward, Miami-Dade, and Palm Beach). 
The Big 3 were not only the largest counties in Florida, they were also 
the most pro-Gore in terms of his net margin of victory on election night. 
They each used punch-card ballots; given both punch cards' well-known 
unreliability and the gains Gore reaped from them during the automatic 
recount, Gore's team probably thought that they were the most lucrative 
potential source of additional votes. 91 Another punch-card county, Duval, 
had almost as many rejected ballots as Miami-Dade and Palm Beach, and 
many more than Broward. However, Duval also favored Bush by 17%. 
Gore's goal was not to count every vote, it was to win, so Duval was off 
his list.92 
Some numbers make clear just how rich a lode the Big 3 must have 
appeared. Multiplying the number of rejected ballots in each county by 
Gore's percentage of victory there provides a crude estimate of each 
county's relative prospects. For instance, if Gore won a county 60% to 
40% and there were 1000 rejected ballots there, the prospect number would 
be 200---ten times as high as in a 60-40 county with 100 rejected ballots, 
or a 51-49 county with 1000 rejected ballots. The prospect number for the 
Big 3 was about +15,000 for Gore. The other pro-Gore counties together 
were under a thousand. The pro-Bush counties were almost -14,000.93 If 
only the Big 3 were recounted, if the new votes came in the same 
proportions as the old votes, and if 10% of the rejected ballots turned into 
90 See TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 29, 83, 165; Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 169 (describing absence of 
recount expertise among Gore's top decision makers). Cf id. at 206 (attributing relative success of 
Bush's legal effort to his divided delegation oflegal and political responsibilities). 
91 See TAPPER, supra note 4, at 61-62, 65--68 (discussing awareness of problems with punch-cards 
and Gore strategizing). 
92 It may also be that Gore's team was misinformed early on about the number of rejected ballots in 
Duval. See Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 169. 
93 County-level vote margins (from which initial vote margins can be approximated) and numbers 
of rejected ballots appear in the Appendix. 
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new votes upon reinspection, the Gore camp could reasonably expect to 
pick up over 1500 votes and win the election. 
All of these counties also had canvassing boards controlled by 
Democrats. County canvassing boards had significant independent 
discretion under the Florida system.94 Gore might have expected that such 
officials would be more sympathetic to his cause, thereby making it more 
likely that he would be able to obtain the recounts he wanted in the manner 
he wanted. 95 
Whatever sense the third faction's strategy made in the fog of the first 
days after election night, however, choosing it was to prove a fatal error. 
By focusing on the messy and difficult-to-interpret punch cards, Gore 
sacrificed the benefits of a quick count. By focusing just on the Big 3, Gore 
took on the drawbacks of a limited count. His recount experts knew better; 
for a challenger, opening up additional cans of worms is a good thing. 96 It 
also had political drawbacks, allowing Bush's team to portray Gore as a 
cherry-picker bent on stealing the election.97 
To be fair, Gore had only limited information before the seventy-two-
hour deadline for requesting hand recounts expired. 98 He was facing 
tremendous political costs. He did not know how long sixty-seven separate 
protests wouid take. The law was not well-settled. Perhaps Gore and his 
team were simply convinced that they had won more votes, if only they 
could get them counted. But to the extent that this conclusion was based on 
irretrievable votes (that is, those for which L was zero or close to it) such 
as those lost to the butterfly ballot,99 it was an irrational one. Moreover, 
given the incredibly complex and rapidly changing factual landscape, it 
was risky to come to any conclusions with such assurance. 
To the extent, however, that Gore thought that he could obtain several 
hundred net votes from the 28,000 undervotes in the Big 3 counties, where 
local officials were all Democrats, and where he had won in the first count 
by more than a 22% margin, his calculations may have made a sort of 
94 See Rambo, supra note 59, at 121 (analyzing statutory basis of individual counties' discretion 
over manual-recount requests). 
95 Cf TAPPER, supra note 4, at 66 (detailing Gore team's concerns about cooperativeness of 
officials in Republican counties). 
96 See supra Part I. D. 
97 See TAPPER, supra note 4, at 345; Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 178. 
98 Compared to Bush, Gore also had fewer lawyers fanned out across all 67 counties. See 
Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 168. 
99 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
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sense. If he concluded that his P exceeded 50% in such a cherry-picked 
recount, it would have been appropriate for him to adopt the posture of a 
recount defender rather than a challenger. As a defender, he would want to 
exclude not only those protests where he could expect to lose ground, but 
even those where gaining ground would come at the cost of unduly 
increasing variance. 
That said, Gore's choice made no sense on its own terms. If the idea 
was to reap big gains quickly, focusing on punch-card ballots in huge 
counties was probably the worst way to do it. Because counties would 
recount individually during the protest phase, they would be working in 
parallel. The time that a recount would take, therefore, would be based on 
whichever county would be the slowest. Gore's three counties were 
Florida's largest, with the most votes to recount. Moreover, hand counting 
punch cards is slow business. The Florida Supreme Court's extension of 
the protest deadline to November 26 allowed each of the three counties to 
attempt a hand recount, but during the time it took to conduct the three-
county recount, every other county would have had plenty of time to 
conduct its own. It would have taken more effort, and more partisans on 
the ground, but it most certainly would not have taken more time. 100 Most 
of these other counties favored Bush, and many of them rejected ballots at 
a higher rate than the Big 3, two things that would have lent valuable 
legitimacy to a recount request from Gore. 
For their part, Bush's team apparently made a different calculation of 
the P represented by Gore's four-county recount. If he had concluded that 
Gore's P was greater than 50% (considering the odds both in court and at 
the counting tables), then Bush would have behaved like a challenger 
instead of a defender and broadly sought out recounts of his own. Rather 
than let Gore cherry-pick unopposed, Bush could have targeted the 
counties that apparently formed his own richest lode. 101 
Instead of countering Gore, though, Bush's team focused its energies 
elsewhere: overseas ballots. Specifically, the Bush team fought to include a 
subset of the overseas absentee ballots that initially had been rejected for 
100 See Steve Bickerstaff, Counts. Recounts. and Election Contests: Lessons from the Florida 
Presidential Election, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425, 465 n.211 (2001) (vouching, based on personal 
experience, for the feasibility of filing timely challenges in each county). 
101 Cf Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 177-78 (describing Gore team's incorrect-but not 
unreasonable-assumption that Bush would respond to Gore's cherry picking with recount requests of 
his own); see supra note 18 (describing Rogers-Byrum recount in 2000). 
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lack of a postmark or other authentication-this notwithstanding Bush's 
efforts elsewhere to keep n low by insisting on strict adherence to rules and 
denigrating recounts. 102 Overseas absentee ballots that had not been 
rejected favored Bush 1380-750,103 so this was fertile ground. Through 
careful collection of data Bush's team was able to discriminate further and 
predict which individual votes were most likely to be for Bush when they 
were opened, and fight in advance only for their inclusion. 104 In other 
words, the votes Bush tried to add had a very high D--and so a high 
expected value-and a very low variance, which is precisely the sort of 
votes to which a recount defender should limit his requests. 
Democratic efforts to be strict about the rules and exclude these votes, 
however legally legitimate, were unpopular and soon disclaimed not only 
by Florida's Democratic Attorney General Robert Butterworth, but by 
vice-presidential candidate Joseph Lieberman as well. It didn't help that 
Gore's public stance elsewhere was to count every vote. But Gore's team 
had a second-best option: if they couldn't get these legally questionable 
votes all tossed out, they could at least have raised D by getting them all 
counted instead of allowing the Bush team to cherry-pick a favorable 
subset of them. Instead, Gore's team essentially conceded this part of the 
game, and with it over 100 net votes. 105 
3. The Contest Phase 
By the time that the protest phase was over, it was clear that Gore's 
strategy of seeking only limited recounts was flawed. Among the Big 3, 
only Broward had completed its recount on time. Even if they had 
completed their recounts in time, moreover, Palm Beach and Miami-Dade 
did not look like they held enough sure votes to swing the election to Gore. 
The contest phase gave Gore a new chance to redeem himself and seek a 
broader recount, with higher n, V, and variance, and he considered various 
additional components to add to his strategy. 106 Instead of taking the 
102 See Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 189-90 (describing Bush strategy). 
103 See id. at 190. 
104 Barstow & Van Natta, supra note 29, at 17 (describing Bush strategy and conduct regarding 
overseas absentee ballots). 
105 See id. at 17-18 (providing a comprehensive account of the handling of overs·eas ballots). 
Barstow and VanNatta reported the Bush gain as 109 net votes; other sources put it at 123 votes. See, 
e.g., TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 176. The latter number better reflects the county-by-county vote totals 
found in the Appendix, but that includes other changes as well. 
106 Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 196 (describing options Gore considered for the contest). 
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opportunity to jettison his flawed strategy, however, Gore decided to 
double down on it. 
Recall that in his contest action, Gore sought five things. The first-
using an incomplete count from Nassau rather than an earlier, more 
complete one-was doomed to failure and his team knew it. 107 
The next was to count the slightly tardy results of the Palm Beach 
recount, worth 215 net votes (but not really), and the partial recount from 
Miami-Dade, worth another 168. 108 This was not enough to overcome his 
537-vote deficit, though. 
The question for Gore, therefore, was where else to look for votes. The 
obvious place, based on optimal recount strategy, would have been to 
maximize n, V, and variance by looking anywhere and everywhere there 
might be net Gore votes. There was a good legal argument to be made that 
counting every vote was the right thing to do, especially with hundreds of 
rejected ballots to inspect per vote separating the candidates. Although it 
requires hindsight to know that the Florida Supreme Court ordered a 
statewide recount-that, in other words, Gore would have found a 
receptive audience if he had argued in court for a broader count-the fact 
that Gore's lawyers resisted when the Court started hinting in that direction 
during oral arguments shows that Gore's team was fiercely committed to 
its low n, low V, low variance, low P strategy. 109 
a) The Big 3 Were Not Enough 
So, instead of looking statewide for new votes, Gore chose two places, 
both of which he had already attempted before: the rest of Miami-Dade-
just the undervotes this time-and the dimpled chad of Palm Beach. His 
strategy for the contest phase was thus essentially to re-fight the protest 
phase; he sought to wring all the votes he needed out of the Big 3, and to 
107 Gore sought to use Nassau's second count, which had left out about 200 votes in a way 
favorable to Gore. Nassau officials knew exactly where the votes in question were; they testified in the 
contest that the votes had been found and were sealed up in a box. Gore could have asked for the box to 
be opened and the votes to be counted, but he did not. If he had, he knew he would have lost. But his 
argument to revert to the first, smaller count had no legal foundation. Gore's Vnet for his Nassau County 
argument was 51 with a variance of zero, but his L was virtually zero, with a variance of virtually zero 
as well. Thus, Gore's best estimation for the value of the Nassau argument should have been zero, with 
zero variance. It appears that this was, indeed, how his lawyers saw it. See TAPPER, supra note 4, at 
387. 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 72-76. 
109 See TAPPER, supra note 4, at 412, 414 (recounting David Boies's argument to Florida Supreme 
Court on behalf of Gore). 
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continue to avoid recounts in the Bush-friendly remainder of the state. Not 
only did this approach ignore the benefits of a wider search for votes, it 
was never likely to yield enough votes to win anyway. To be sure, with a 
positive expected value these arguments were worth including. Perhaps 
they might have even been at the top of the list of recount options worth 
including. They were not, however, the only things worth including. They 
were clearly not enough to justify any notion that Gore's P was greater 
than 50%. 
First, the dimples. It was known that of Broward's 567 net votes for 
Gore, 420 of them came from dimpled chads. 110 Similar proportions were 
evident, if not precisely known, in Palm Beach. Gore understood this, and 
it is why he fought to have the court count the Palm Beach dimples. 
However, the problem was another variable: L. Gore was asking for more 
of Palm Beach's presidential dimples to be counted as votes; Palm Beach 
had counted dimples only when the voter made dimples all through the 
ballot. 111 Gore was following the optimal strategy here, at least-he sought 
to maximize V, and variance with it. But Palm Beach's standard made 
sense, and it was not going to be easy for Gore to convince the courts that 
an isolated dimple had to count as an expression of voter intent. Gore's 
argument was also complicated by the fact that his partisans on the ground 
had not pressed for a more inclusive standard during the Palm Beach hand 
recount itself. 112 Even if it was an argument worth making-and it was, 
since if successful, it would have delivered Gore enough votes to win the 
election 113 -this was not an argument worth banking on. 
Second, the remainder of Miami-Dade. Using the crudest of 
calculations, Gore argued that because he had gained 168 from an 
examination of a fifth of Miami-Dade's undervote, he could expect to gain 
600 more from an examination of the rest of them. This expectation was 
ludicrous, and it was obvious at the time that it was ludicrous. The partial 
recount had covered some of Gore's strongholds; overall he won these 
precincts three to one in the initial count. The remainder of the county had 
supported Bush by a slight margin, and so promised to be unhelpful for 
110 See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Mistake in Citing Illinois Case Gives Bush Ammo, CHI. TRIB., 
Dec. I, 2000, at I. 
111 See supra text accompanying note 76. 
112 Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 187 (describing how Gore team pushed for inclusive counts in other 
counties, but not Palm Beach). Moreover, Gore had the burden of introducing evidence (as opposed to 
mere argument) that Palm Beach had rejected legal votes, but he introduced none. See id at 200. 
113 See id at 186 & nn.154-55. 
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Gore if recounted. All of this information was available at the time, and it 
seems as though at least some people in the Gore camp understood it. 114 
If one "ecologically regressed" Miami-Dade's undervote-i.e., divided 
it up precinct-by-precinct according to the candidates' respective 
proportions of votes in the initial count-Gore had a potential net gain of 
1,676 votes in the entire county. The partial recount revealed, however, 
that only about 20% of the ballots revealed a choice; discounting for this 
drops Gore's expected gain to about 344 votes. Of these 344 votes, though, 
229 come from precincts included in the partial recount, leaving Gore with 
only 115 net votes from the remainder of the county, rather than the 600 he 
surmised. 115 But even 115 was too much, given the disproportionately poor 
showing Gore made in all of the punch-card hand counts. After all, the 
partial recount had not netted Gore 229 votes, but only 168, because Gore 
voters in Miami-Dade were actually more likely to punch out their chad 
properly than Bush voters were. Taking this into account, Gore reasonably 
should have expected either to gain very little from the remainder of 
Miami-Dade, or actually to lose ground. 116 He had no reasonable basis to 
expect to gain even 100 net votes, let alone the 600 he claimed. 
b) The Rest of the State, Scan Ballots, and Overvotes 
Thus, the P from Gore's contest was small, and certainly below 50%. 
This probability takes us back once more to the counterintuitive core of the 
optimal recount strategy for a challenger. The only time a challenger 
should not seek to include a group of votes in a recount is if they not only 
are expected to favor the opponent, but are expected to do so with a high 
114 See TAPPER, supra note 4, at 280 (noting distribution of Miami-Dade undervotes); id. at 379 
(attributing belief to Gore lawyer David Boies that "he's not even sure Gore would gain votes" in the 
remainder of Miami-Dade); Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 200-{)1. I myself made this point at the time. 
See John Fund, The Myth of Miami, OPINIONJOURNAL.COM (Nov. 26, 2000, II :59 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI22416778513540613 (quoting the high end of my estimate of 
likely results and noting that "Mr. Kalt's analysis squares with that of other political observers"). 
115 Precinct-by-precinct results in the initial count and partial recount, from which these 
calculations are derived, are available at Bruce Hansen's Florida Data Page, 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/-bhansen/vote/dadedata.xls (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). The data match the 
numbers from the official county website, 
http://www.miamidade.gov/elections/results/ele00312/CANVOOOl.HTM (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
Neither data set matches the official totals, however; the totals are irreconcilable. They are close 
enough for present purposes, though. 
116 The Miami Herald's recount put his loss from the remainder of the undervotes at 135. Amy 
Driscoll, Review of Undervotes Includes Dimples, Chads, Clean Punches, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 26, 
200l,at 17A. 
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degree of certainty (i.e., low variance). To see what Gore should have tried 
to do with the ballots outside the Big 3, therefore, we must survey what he 
knew or should have known about them. 
Although it may never be known exactly what Gore and his team 
actually knew, some data were clearly available during the;; election 
controversy itself. Whether or not Gore's team knew these things, it is a 
very matter of basic recount strategy to try to collect such data. 117 At the 
very least, any facts that were reported in newspapers at the time were 
constructively known to the campaigns themselves. 
By the time the protest phase was over on November 26, a lot of things 
were definitely known. Every county had done at least some recounting, 
and Volusia, Broward, and Palm Beach had done complete hand recounts. 
Gore also had a large team of partisans who could have spent the 
intervening time collecting data. 118 The Miami Herald ran a story on 
December 3 in which it allocated all of the undervotes and overvotes 
statewide according to precinct-level voting percentages. 119 Certainly 
Gore's team could have acquired precinct-level data even faster, to get a 
better idea of where recounts would help or hurt the most. 
One source of broader information was Volusia, which performed the 
first and fastest protest-phase recount. Because Volusia used scan ballots 
rather than punch cards, the process was not bogged down in the 
interpretation of chad, and it was less than half the size of Palm Beach, the 
smallest of the Big 3. Its hand recount was completed on November 14, 
before hand counting in the Big 3 had even begun. 120 
Because Gore had won Volusia by an 8% margin, he could have been 
comfortable in the knowledge that he was likely to gain some net votes 
from a Volusia recount. He did, netting 98 votes. Among the hundreds of 
votes that were machine-rejected but added after hand inspection, Gore 
picked up almost twice as many as Bush 121-further evidence of Gore's 
117 Good, precinct-level data on county tallies were quickly available on some county websites, and 
at Bruce Hansen, Florida Data Page, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/-bhansen/vote/ data.html (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2014). From my perch in Michigan, I personally collected other data and explanations by 
contacting individual county elections officials; Gore's team did the same. TOOB!N, supra note 5, at 84 
(describing Gore team's activities). 
118 Cf Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 208 (criticizing Gore team's subpar organization and 
information gathering). 
119 Anabelle de Gale et al., A Flawless Vote Would Have Shown a Winner: Analysis Finds an Edge 
for Gore, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 3, 2000, at I A. 
120 See Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 184-85. 
121 TAPPER, supra note 4, at 181 (reporting 241-143 Gore margin in Vol usia recount). 
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disproportionate yield among hand-counted scan ballots; of how quickly 
scan ballots could be hand counted; and of the rich potential of overvotes. 
In sum, it was further evidence that Gore lacked the combination of 
negative expected value and low variance that would have justified 
excluding the rest of the state from his requested recounts. 
It is one of the enduring mysteries of the recount why Gore 
concentrated in the contest on undervotes to the exclusion of overvotes. 122 
Perhaps it was simply that hand inspection of an undervote could reveal a 
choice that the machine had missed, while overvotes seemed 
unsalvageable; if a person voted for more than one candidate, how could 
you tell which one the voter supported? 
This reasoning made more sense for the punch-card ballots that Gore 
focused on so single-mindedly. A punch-card reader might miss a vote if 
the requisite piece of chad failed to detach completely (an undervote). If 
the piece of chad, though still attached, was affected enough for a human 
to notice, the intent of the voter might be determined. It is hard to see, 
however, how the machine might mistakenly count a piece of chad as 
punched out when it was still in place (an overvote). Once more than one 
piece of chad is punched out, moreover, there generally would be no way 
to determine which one of the two an individual voter meant to choose. 
On scan ballots, however, overvotes were not necessarily 
undecipherable. In some cases, erasures, spillover, and stray marks might 
have been misinterpreted as votes by the machine but easily interpreted 
correctly by human eyes. Moreover, as already discussed, redundant write-
in votes were unfortunately common. 123 
These possibilities for recovering scan overvotes would have been well 
known to anyone who had conducted a recount before-as people on 
Gore's team had. 124 Even if they were not so obvious, they were revealed 
very early in the recount. It was reported in the Orlando Sentinel on 
November 14 that several counties, aware that voters had cast redundant 
122 See Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 194-95 (discussing Gore team's puzzling but fatal disregard for 
the potential gains from overvotes). 
123 See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. The same error was possible in punch-card counties 
too, if voters were directed to punch a hole to indicate that they were writing in a choice, but that was 
not generally the case. See, e.g., MARTIN MERZER ET AL., THE MIAMI HERALD REPORT: DEMOCRACY 
HELD HOSTAGE 154{(2001) (showing Palm Beach punch-card ballot). 
124 See DOWNS ET AL., supra note I, at 31-34 (describing recoverability of scan overvotes); 
TAPPER, supra note 4, at 184, 193-94. 
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write-in votes, had decided not to count them. 125 But other counties, like 
Gadsden and Orange, had counted these votes by hand, and revealed that 
Gore voters had cast a greatly disproportionate number of them; this 
evidence was known during the automatic recount, in the first days of the 
whole recount episode. 126 Despite this evidence that Gore could pick up a 
lot of votes quickly from hand counts in scan counties, he never asked to 
count them, instead relying on the Big 3 and on undervotes in his 
arguments before the Florida and U.S. Supreme Courts. 
This determination may have been based on the fact that scan counties 
tended to be Republican, and that Orange and Gadsden, two Democratic 
counties, had apparently already been recounted. But Orange and Gadsden 
had shown that Gore voters were much more likely to cast redundant write-
in ballots than were Bush voters. Moreover, even without this direct 
evidence of a favorable D, it was still worth taking the chance. Even 
though the scan ballots were mostly found in counties that, on balance, 
favored Bush, there was no basis to conclude with such certainty that 
recounting them would have favored Bush. Gore should have sought to 
recount them. 127 
Another reason that Gore might have disregarded the scan counties was 
that they tended to be small. Although they represented 41 of Florida's 67 
counties, they represented only 38% of the total votes cast, and only 18% 
of the rejected ballots. 128 (There were other punch-card counties outside the 
Big 3, but they too tended to be smaller.) 
Obviously, though, 18% was not zero. Maximizing n, V, and variance 
means not writing off large heaps of potential votes. Higher n and V are 
valuable, even if they come from collecting a lot of crumbs. In this case, 
the crumbs added up to a rather large slice. While each additional county 
would have represented an expense of resources to the Gore campaign, 
small counties could execute hand recounts more quickly than large ones 
125 Maxwell & Damron, supra note 54. 
126 See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. 
127 In a misstep, Bush's team argued that if undervotes were reexamined, overvotes would need to 
be reexamined too. This argument was obviously contrary to the optimal strategy for defenders, and 
would have been costly-possibly fatal-to Bush's chances had it succeeded. See David Damron & 
Roger Roy, Both Teams Misjudged Strategy to Win Recount, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 12, 2001, at 
B I, available at 200 I WLNR I 0878414. 
128 Information on the number of rejected ballots, grouped by voting method, appears in the 
Appendix. 
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like the Big 3. 129 As Vol usia's recount suggested, scan-ballot recounts also 
would have been less controversial as they would not have turned on the 
interpretation of the myriad types of mis-punched chad. 130 
Importantly, many scan counties rejected ballots at a much higher rate 
than the punch-card counties. There were two types of scan counting 
systems. In one, "precinct scan," each precinct had scanning equipment so 
that if a ballot was rejected, the voter found out immediately and could 
correct it. In the other system, "central scan," all of the ballots were sent to 
a central county office and scanned there, giving the voter no opportunity 
to fix an error. Not surprisingly, the rate of rejected ballots was much 
higher in central-scan counties (5.63%) than in precinct-scan counties 
(0.80%), but it was also higher than in the much-ballyhooed punch-card 
counties (3.92%). 131 In Orange County, a precinct-scan county, almost one-
fourth of the rejected ballots came from a single precinct where a poll 
worker did not give voters a chance to fix their rejected ballots; this poll 
worker's actions alone cost Gore a net of 60 votes. 132 If Gore's team had 
wanted to limit the scope of the scan-ballot recounts, it could have at least 
focused on the central-scan counties, instead of pretending that punch 
cards were the only problem in Florida. 
Put in terms of optimal recount strategy, recounts in these counties 
might have appeared at first to have a low D for Gore, along with low n 
and low V. But there was evidence that D was actually quite good, and 
even without that, adding any n and Vis good when it comes with enough 
variance. The same goes for the punch-card counties outside the Big 3, and 
the counties using other voting systems. 
To summarize, the only way that Gore should have brought a contest as 
limited as the one he did was if the elements he chose gave him a P of 
greater than 50%. At that point, he would have been justified in behaving 
like a defender, seeking to avoid recounting any other groups of votes 
unless he was reasonably sure they would help him. But Gore should not 
have felt that way about the P presented by his limited contest. He should 
129 See Gary Kane and Scott Hiaasen, Optical Scanners Deliver Quicker Ballot Recounts, PALM 
BEACH POST, Nov. 16, 2000, at 14A, available at 2000 WLNR 1688197. 
130 See supra text accompanying note 120 (discussing Volusia). 
131 lnfonnation on the number of rejected ballots, grouped by voting method, appears in the 
Appendix. 
132 Roger Roy & Michael Griffin, Errors Cost Orange Votes: Some Poll Workers Ignored 
Warnings, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 4, 2001, at AI, available at 2001 WLNR 10891094 (describing 
Orange debacle). 
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have sought more votes, and more variance. A statewide recount would 
have provided plenty of both. 
4. Other Foibles 
As mentioned already, there is now no doubt that the butterfly ballot in 
Palm Beach led to thousands of Gore voters miscasting their ballots, either 
overvoting for both Gore and Pat Buchanan, or erroneously marking just 
Buchanan.133 Thousands more in Duval, where the presidential candidates 
were listed on two pages, voted for Gore and voted again for another 
candidate on the second page. 134 It is beyond any reasonable doubt that, in 
statistical terms, a huge number of Gore votes were lost in these 
manners.
135 If they had been converted into "legal" votes, Gore would have 
won by a comfortable margin. These lost votes may be the reason why 
Gore led in exit polls, and why his team might have been more apt than it 
should have been to approach the recount as cautious favorites rather than 
hungry underdogs. 136 Nevertheless, Gore's team did realize---<:orrectly-
that there was little they could do to obtain these virtual votes. 137 To the 
extent that there was some chance of legal success, Gore could and did rely 
on third parties to press these cases, but he did not bank on their success. 138 
It also emerged in the immediate aftermath of the election that 
Republican elected officials in Seminole and Martin Counties had allowed 
Republican party activists to correct absentee ballot applications. These 
applications, sent out by the Republican party, had incomplete information 
because of a printing error. It could not be determined how many of these 
applications led to ballots actually being cast for Bush: these voters might 
have not voted, voted in person, obtained absentee ballots in some other 
manner, or voted for someone other than Bush. Still, the number of fixed 
applications was large enough that just about any remedy involving the 
exclusion of such votes would have resulted in a large enough net gain for 
Gore to reverse the election result. In the case of Seminole and Martin, 
moreover, Gore did not want to be in the position of advocating for the 
disenfranchisement of any voters, even ones that he knew favored his 
133 See Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 172 (describing Palm Beach problems). 
134 See id. at 173 (describing Duval problems). 
135 See Wand et al., supra note 20 (analyzing effect of butterfly ballot). 
136 TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 18 (describing exit poll results). But see TAPPER, supra note 4, at 29-
30 (recounting errors and incompetence in the exit polling). 
137 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
138 See Bickerstaff, supra note 6, at 176 (describing third-party suits). 
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opponent. This preference was no doubt underscored by the fact that 
Gore's team knew that their chances of success in court were slim. 139 
It must have been galling for Gore's team to know that these things had 
cost their candidate the presidency but that there was little they could do 
about them. The Palm Beach and Duval debacles represented a failure of 
the most basic task of election administration: accurately collecting and 
reporting voters' preferences. But as a matter of recount strategy, Gore's 
team got this part of the analysis right, recognizing that L was so low here 
that actions in these counties would have added virtually nothing to P. 
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The optimal recount strategy described in this Article derived the 
following lessons: 
1. Challengers will seek recounts if they are better off with one than 
without one. 
2. Challengers will win when they find more new votes than they are 
behind by, and successfully convert them into actual votes (if L · Vnet > 
M). The probability of this occurring is P. 
3. All other things being equal, challengers maximize P by: 
a) casting as many votes as possible into question (maximizing nand V). 
b) increasing D, the probability that a new vote will go to them instead of 
their opponents. 
c) increasing the uncertainty (variance) of the predicted results of the 
count. 
4. Variance will be significantly higher than a simple bell-curve model 
would suggest. 
5. Variance will increase the less reliable the first count is, the less reliable 
the recount is, and the less consistent the recount method is with that of 
the first count. 
6. In a recount with discrete subgroups of votes to recount, challengers 
should try to include those groups where the expected value of Vnet is 
139 See TAPPER, supra note 4, at 329. 
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positive, or if not, where the variance associated with the prediction is 
sufficiently high. Given Point #4 above, this will more often be the case 
than one might think. 
7. Defenders, or challengers whose P exceeds 50%, should try to include 
subgroups of votes only if their expected value is positive and the 
variance is sufficiently low-votes that they expect to help them, so 
long as they are sure of that. 
Hindsight is irresistible here, given the time, money, and effort that 
went into the media's thorough examination of the Florida ballots in the 
months following the election. That review showed that the best way for 
AI Gore to have won would have been if Florida had recounted all the 
undervotes and overvotes statewide. 140 
The point is not that challengers always win if they seek the broadest 
recounts or the most liberal possible standards. The fact remains that 
whatever strategy they use, recount challengers usually lose, even if Gore 
might have won here. 141 The point is to maximize one's chances of 
success, not to somehow guarantee it. Ex ante, the broader the recount and 
the more liberal the standard, the better the odds are for challengers. To put 
Point #6 above into layman's terms, recount challengers should seek to 
recount not just votes that they expect to help them, but also votes that they 
expect to hurt them, so long as they are not too sure of that. AI Gore's 
recount lawyers understood this. Gore and his political advisers did not, 
and that is why Gore lost the presidency. 
140 See Cauchon & Drinkard, supra note 3. 
141 Ironically, the more liberal the standard for counting punch-card votes, the better Bush would 
have done. See id. Broader counts mean better odds for challengers, but by no means do they represent 
a sure thing. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Certified vote totals and percentages by county· 
County Total Votes Bush Gore Other Bush% Gore% 
Alachua 85,757 34,135 47,380 4,242 39.80% 55.25% 
Baker 8,155 5,611 2,392 152 68.80% 29.33% 
Bay 58,876 38,682 18,873 1,321 65.70% 32.06% 
Bradford 8,675 5,416 3,075 184 62.43% 35.45% 
Brevard 218,488 115,253 97,341 5,894 52.75% 44.55% 
Broward 575,239 177,939 387,760 9,540 30.93% 67.41% 
Calhoun 5,175 2,873 2,156 146 55.52% 41.66% 
Charlotte 66,900 35,428 29,646 1,826 52.96% 44.31% 
Citrus 57,248 29 801 25,531 1,916 52.06% 44.60% 
Clay 57,559 41,903 14,668 988 72.80% 25.48% 
Collier 92,202 60,467 29,939 1,796 65.58% 32.47% 
Columbia 18,514 10,968 7,049 497 59.24% 38.07% 
DeSoto 7,812 4,256 3,321 235 54.48% 42.51% 
Dixie 4,667 2,697 1,827 143 57.79% 39.15% 
Duval 265,181 152,460 108,039 4,682 57.49% 40.74% 
Escambia 116,856 73 171 40,990 2,695 62.62% 35.08% 
Flagler 27,116 12,618 13,897 601 46.53% 51.25% 
Franklin 4,645 2,454 2,047 144 52.83% 44.07% 
Gadsden 14,731 4,770 9,736 225 32.38% 66.09% 
Gilchrist 5,395 3,300 1,910 185 61.17% 35.40% 
Glades 3 365 I 841 I 442 82 54.71% 42.85% 
Gulf 6,148 3 553 2,398 197 57.79% 39.00% 
Hamilton 3,966 2 147 1,723 96 54.14% 43.44% 
Hardee 6 236 3 765 2 342 129 60.38% 37.56% 
Hendry 8 139 4 747 3 240 152 58.32% 39.81% 
Hernando 65 236 30 658 32 648 I 930 47.00% 50.05% 
Highlands 35 152 20207 14169 776 57.48% 40.31% 
Hillsborough 360,354 180 794 169 576 9,984 50.17% 47.06% 
Holmes 7 396 5 012 2 177 207 67.77% 29.43% 
Indian River 49 627 28 639 19 769 1,219 57.71% 39.84% 
Jackson 16,303 9 139 6 870 294 56.06% 42.14% 
Jefferson 5 643 2 478 3 041 124 43.91% 53.89% 
Lafayette 2 505 I 670 789 46 66.67% 31.50% 
Lake 88 611 50010 36 571 2 030 56.44% 41.27% 
Lee 184 400 106 151 73 571 4 678 57.57% 39.90% 
Leon 103 154 39 073 61 444 2 637 37.88% 59.57% 
Levy 12 730 6 863 5 398 469 53.91% 42.40% 
Liberty 2 410 I 317 I 017 76 54.65% 42.20% 
Madison 6 163 3 038 3 015 110 49.29% 48.92% 
Manatee 110,344 58 023 49 226 3 095 52.58% 44.61% 
Marion 102,971 55 146 44 674 3 151 53.56% 43.39% 
Martin 62 016 33 972 26 621 I 423 54.78% 42.93% 
Miami-Dade 625 552 289 574 328 867 7 Ill 46.29% 52.57% 
Monroe 33 895 16 063 16487 I 345 47.39% 48.64% 
Nassau 23 787 16408 6 955 424 68.98% 29.24% 
Okaloosa 70 819 52 186 16989 I 644 73.69% 23.99% 
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County Total Votes Bush Gore Other Bush% Gore% 
Okeechobee 9,854 5,057 4,589 208 51.32% 46.57% 
Orange 280 155 134 531 140 236 5 388 48.02% 50.06% 
Osceola 55,690 26,237 28,187 1,266 47.11% 50.61% 
Palm Beach 433,222 152,964 269,754 10,504 35.31% 62.27% 
Pasco 142,769 68,607 69,576 4,586 48.05% 48.73% 
Pinellas 398,526 184,849 200,657 13,020 46.38% 50.35% 
Polk 168,629 90,310 75,207 3,112 53.55% 44.60% 
Putnam 26239 13 457 12 107 675 51.29% 46.14% 
Santa Rosa 50,402 36,339 12,818 1,245 72.10% 25.43% 
Sarasota 160,977 83,117 72,869 4,991 51.63% 45.27% 
Seminole 137,805 75,790 59,227 2,788 55.00% 42.98% 
St. Johns 60,771 39,564 19,509 1,698 65.10% 32.10% 
St. Lucie 77,990 34,705 41,560 1,725 44.50% 53.29% 
Sumter 22 261 12 127 9 637 497 54.48% 43.29% 
Suwannee 12,461 8,009 4,076 376 64.27% 32.71% 
Taylor 6,810 4,058 2 649 103 59.59% 38.90% 
Union 3,826 2,332 1,407 87 60.95% 36.77% 
Vol usia 183,674 82,368 97,313 3,993 44.84% 52.98% 
Wakulla 8,587 4,512 3,838 237 52.54% 44.70% 
Walton 18 323 12 186 5 643 494 66.51% 30.80% 
Washington 8,026 4,995 2,798 233 62.24% 34.86% 
Totals 5 963110 2 912 790 2 912 253 138 067 48.85% 48.84% 
• Source: Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections- Data Graphs, http://uselectionatlas.org/ 
RESULTS/datagraph.php?year=2000&fips=12&f=l &off=O&elect=O (last visited March 3, 2014). 
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Table 2. Results by county: initial count (1118); automatic recount (I 1114); 
late overseas absentees (11118); final recounts and certified totals (I 1126/ 
Initial Count Automatic Late Overseas Final Certified Totals County Recount ** Absenteest Recounts~ 
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore 
Alachua 34,062 47,300 62 65 II 15 34,135 47,380 
Baker 5,610 2,392 0 0 1 0 5,611 2,392 
Bay 38,637 18,850 0 0 38 18 7 5 38,682 18,873 
Bradford 5,413 3,072 1 3 2 0 5,416 3,075 
Brevard 115,185 97,318 0 0 54 17 14 6 115,253 97,341 
Broward 177,279 386,518 44 43 37 53 579 1,146 177,939 387,760 
Calhoun 2,873 2,155 0 0 0 1 2,873 2,156 
Charlotte 35,419 29,641 7 4 2 I 35,428 29,646 
Citrus 29,744 25,501 22 24 34 6 1 0 29,801 25,531 
Clay 41,745 14,630 -9 2 154 35 13 1 41,903 14,668 
Collier 60,426 29,905 7 13 9 11 25 10 60,467 29,939 
Columbia 10,964 7,047 0 0 4 2 10,968 7,049 
DeSoto 4,256 3,322 0 -2 0 I 4,256 3,321 
Dixie 2,698 1,825 -1 1 0 I 2,697 1,827 
Duval 152,082 107,680 16 184 318 151 44 24 152,460 108,039 
Escambia 73,029 40,958 -12 -15 109 38 45 9 73,171 40,990 
Flagler 12,608 13,891 5 6 5 0 12,618 13,897 
Franklin 2,448 2,042 6 4 0 I 2,454 2,047 
Gadsden 4,750 9,565 17 170 3 I 4,770 9,736 
Gilchrist 3,300 1,910 0 0 0 0 3,300 1,910 
Glades 1,840 1,440 I 2 0 0 1,841 1,442 
Gulf 3,546 2,389 4 8 3 I 3,553 2,398 
Hamilton 2,153 1,718 -7 4 I 1 2,147 1,723 
Hardee 3,764 2,341 I -2 0 3 3,765 2,342 
Hendry 4,743 3,239 4 1 0 0 4,747 3,240 
Hernando 30,646 32,644 0 0 12 4 30,658 32,648 
Highlands 20,196 14,152 10 15 I 2 20,207 14,169 
Hillsborough 180,713 169,529 47 28 34 19 180,794 169,576 
Holmes 4,985 2,154 26 23 I 0 5,012 2,177 
Indian River 28,627 19,769 8 -1 4 I 28,639 19,769 
Jackson 9,138 6,868 0 0 I 2 9,139 6,870 
Jefferson 2,481 3,038 -3 3 0 0 2,478 3,041 
Lafayette 1,669 788 I 1 0 0 1,670 789 
Lake 49,963 36,555 47 16 36* 18* 50,010 36,571 
Lee 106,123 73,530 18 30 10 II 106,151 73,571 
Leon 39,053 61,425 9 2 11 17 39,073 61,444 
Levy 6,860 5,403 -2 -5 5 0 6,863 5,398 
Liberty 1,316 1,011 I 6 0 0 1,317 1,017 
Madison 3,038 3,011 0 3 0 I 3,038 3,015 
Manatee 57,948 49,169 4 8 55 37 16 12 58,023 49,226 
Marion 55,135 44,648 6 17 5 9 55,146 44,674 
Martin 33,864 26,619 106 1 2 I 33,972 26,621 
Miami-Dade 289,456 328,702 77 100 41 59 0 6 289,574 328,867 
Monroe 16,059 16,483 0 0 4 4 16,063 16,487 
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Initial Count Automatic Late Overseas Final Certified Totals County Recount 
.. Absenteest Recounts: 
Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore Bush Gore 
Nassau 16,404 6,952 -124 -73 3 3 125 73 16,408 6,955 
Okaloosa 52,043 16,924 50 24 91 40 2 I 52,186 16,989 
Okeechobee 5,058 4,588 -I 0 0 I 5,057 4,589 
Orange 134,476 140,115 41 105 14 16 134,531 140,236 
Osceola 26,216 28,177 -4 4 25 6 26,237 28,187 
Palm Beach 152,846 268,945 105 787 13 22 152,964 269,754 
Pasco 68,581 69,550 I 14 13 6 12 6 68,607 69,576 
Pinellas 184,884 200,212 -61 417 24 27 2 I 184,849 200,657 
Polk 90,101 74,977 194 223 II 4 4 3 90,310 75,207 
Putnam 13,439 12,091 8 II 10 5 13,457 12,107 
Santa Rosa 36,248 12,795 26 7 36 8 29 8 36,339 12,818 
Sarasota 83,100 72,854 0 -I 17 16 83,117 72,869 
Seminole 75,293 58,888 384 286 113 53 75,790 59,227 
St. Johns 39,497 19,482 49 20 18 7 39,564 19,509 
St. Lucie 34,705 41,559 0 0 0 I 34,705 41,560 
Sumter 12,126 9,634 1 3 0 0 12,127 9,637 
Suwannee 8,014 4,084 -8 -9 3 I 8,009 4,076 
Taylor 4,050 2,647 6 2 2 0 4,058 2,649 
Union 2,326 1,399 6 8 0 0 2,332 1,407 
Volusia 82,214 97,063 143 241 II 9 82,368 97,313 
Wakulla 4,511 3,835 I 3 0 0 4,512 3,838 
Walton 12,176 5,637 6 5 4 1 12,186 5,643 
Washington 4,983 2,796 It 2 I 0 4,995 2,798 
Totals 2,909,135 2,907,351 1,357 2,841 1,380 750 918 1,311 2,912,790 2,912,253 
Bush Lead 1,784 -1,484 +630 -393 537 
• Sources: Latest County-by-County Results, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 15, 2000, at 19A (automatic-
recount results, from which initial results can be derived); David Firestone, Hand Tallies Go On, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2000, at 1 (overseas absentee results); Florida Recount, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, 
http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpoli tics/elections/flacountyrecounts ll2700.htm (last visited 
March 3, 2014) (final changes); Dave Leip 's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections - Data Graphs, 
http:/ /uselectionatlas.org/RES UL TS/datagraph. php?year=2000&fips= 12&f-= I &off-=O&elect=O (last 
visited March 3, 2014) (final totals). 
"Includes Volusia County hand recount. Lake County had +II Bush, -2 Gore from the automatic 
recount, but also counted military ballots received to that point (+36 Bush, +18 Gore) instead of 
waiting until November 17. See Anthony Colarossi, Lake's Absentees Could Be the Key, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Nov. 16,2000, at I, available at 2000 WLNR 8608612. The military ballots are included in 
the total for the automatic recount. They are also listed in the columns for late overseas absentee ballots 
but are not included in the totals there. 
t Over 12,000 overseas absentee ballots were received by Election Day and are included in the 
preliminary count rather than here. See Bryan Gilmer et at., 300 and Counting, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Nov. 15, 2000, at I A, available at 2000 WLNR 8817467. 
1 Changes made between November 18 and 26 include the hand recount from Broward; Nassau's 
rejection of its automatic recount results; the re-evaluation of overseas absentee ballots (including one 
for Bush from Nassau); the sample recount in Miami-Dade; and others not explained. See Florida 
Recount, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/elections/ 
flacountyrecounts112700.htm (last visited March 3, 2014) (listing changes and explaining some); Scott 
Hiaasen & Stephen Kiehl, Counties Changed How Overseas Ballots Tallied, PALM PEACH POST, Dec. 
2, 2000, at 23A, available at 2000 WLNR 1678266 (listing some results from re-evaluation of overseas 
absentee ballots); supra text accompanying note 69 (discussing Nassau). 
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Table 3. County voting methods and number of rejected ballots 
(not reflecting hand recounts/ 
County Voting Total Over- Under- Un- Total Over- Under- Total Method Ballots votes votes known Rejects vote% vote 0/o Reject% 
Alachua P Scan 86,056 102 225 327 0.12% 0.26% 0.38% 
Baker P Scan 8,294 46 94 140 0.55% 1.13% 1.69% 
Bay P Scan 59,468 134 529 663 0.23% 0.89% 1.11% 
Bradford C Scan 9,407 695 40 735 7.39% 0.43% 7.81% 
Brevard P Scan 219,427 136 277 413 0.06% 0.13% 0.19% 
Broward Punch 588,007 7,925 6,686 14,611 1.35% 1.14% 2.48% 
Calhoun P Scan 5,252 9 78 87 0.17% 1.49% 1.66% 
Charlotte CScan 70,052 2,988 168 3,156 4.27% 0.24% 4.51% 
Citrus P Scan 57,418 54 163 217 0.09% 0.28% 0.38% 
Clay P Scan 57,506 161 233 394 0.28% 0.41% 0.69% 
Collier Punch 95,325 1,102 2,086 3,188 1.16% 2.19% 3.34% 
Columbia P Scan 19,201 617 76 693 3.21% 0.40% 3.61% 
DeSoto Punch 8,506 701 701 0.00% 0.00% 8.24% 
Dixie Punch 4,998 332 332 0.00% 0.00% 6.64% 
Duval Punch 291,545 21,942 4,967 26,909 7.53% 1.70% 9.23% 
Escambia P Scan 121,020 4,372 4,372 0.00% 0.00% 3.61% 
Flagler P Scan 27,173 7 55 62 0.03% 0.20% 0.23% 
Franklin CScan 5,063 349 70 419 6.89% 1.38% 8.28% 
Gadsden C Scan 16,800 1,951 122 2,073 11.61% 0.73% 12.34% 
Gilchrist Punch 5,683 288 288 0.00% 0.00% 5.07% 
Glades Punch 3,738 358 358 0.00% 0.00% 9.58% 
Gulf CScan 6,555 363 48 411 5.54% 0.73% 6.27% 
Hamilton CScan 4,353 0 389 389 0.00% 8.94% 8.94% 
Hardee Punch 6,641 323 85 408 4.86% 1.28% 6.14% 
Hendry C Scan 8,938 39 761 800 0.44% 8.51% 8.95% 
Hernando P Scan 65,467 147 101 248 0.22% 0.15% 0.38% 
Highlands Punch 36,158 520 489 1,009 1.44% 1.35% 2.79% 
Hillsborough Punch 369,467 3,641 5,531 9,172 0.99% 1.50% 2.48% 
Holmes P Scan 7,534 148 148 0.00% 0.00% 1.96% 
Indian River Punch 51,559 879 1,058 1,937 1.70% 2.05% 3.76% 
Jackson CScan 17,457 1,063 94 1,157 6.09% 0.54% 6.63% 
Jefferson Punch 6,215 571 571 0.00% 0.00% 9.19% 
Lafayette CScan 2,676 171 171 0.00% 0.00% 6.39% 
Lake CScan 92,225 3,114 245 3,359 3.38% 0.27% 3.64% 
Lee Punch 188,944 2,550 2,017 4,567 1.35% 1.07% 2.42% 
Leon P Scan 103,305 181 181 0.00% 0.18% 0.18% 
Levy_ CScan 13,484 708 52 760 5.25% 0.39% 5.64% 
Liberty CScan 2,598 159 29 188 6.12% 1.12% 7.24% 
Madison Punch 6,642 481 481 0.00% 0.00% 7.24% 
Manatee P Scan 111,631 1,263 0 1,263 1.13% 0.00% 1.13% 
Marion Punch 106,301 900 2,445 3,345 0.85% 2.30% 3.15% 
Martin Machine 62,623 175 175 0.00% 0.00% 0.28% 
Miami-Dade Punch 654,042 17,851 10,750 28,601 2.73% 1.64% 4.37% 
Monroe P Scan 34,058 97 83 180 0.28% 0.24% 0.53% 
Nassau Punch 25,162 1,410 195 1,605 5.60% 0.77% 6.38% 
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County Voting Total Over- Under- Un- Total Over- Under- Total Method Ballots votes votes known Rejects vote 0/o vote% Reject% 
Okaloosa P Scan 71,445 680 85 765 0.95% 0.12% 1.07% 
Okeechobee CScan 10,711 774 84 858 7.23% 0.78% 8.01% 
Orange P Scan 282,529 1,383 966 2,349 0.49% 0.34% 0.83% 
Osceola Punch 57,341 1,042 642 1,684 1.82% 1.12% 2.94% 
Palm Beach Punch 462,880 19,120 10,582 29,702 4.13% 2.29% 6.42% 
Pasco Punch 146,648 2,141 1,776 3,917 1.46% 1.21% 2.67% 
Pinellas Punch 406,956 4,261 4,226 8,487 1.05% 1.04% 2.09% 
Polk P Scan 169,507 671 228 899 0.40% 0.13% 0.53% 
Putnam P Scan 26,390 78 90 168 0.30% 0.34% 0.64% 
Santa Rosa P Scan 50,684 325 325 0.00% 0.00% 0.64% 
Sarasota Punch 164,180 991 1,809 2,800 0.60% 1.10% 1.71% 
Seminole P Scan 137,904 48 219 267 0.03% 0.16% 0.19% 
St. Johns P Scan 61,304 132 426 558 0.22% 0.69% 0.91% 
St. Lucie P Scan 78,638 112 537 649 0.14% 0.68% 0.83% 
Sumter Punch 23,023 169 593 762 0.73% 2.58% 3.31% 
Suwannee CScan 13,173 690 42 732 5.24% 0.32% 5.56% 
Taylor C Scan 7,407 517 82 599 6.98% 1.11% 8.09% 
Union Paper 4,084 258 258 0.00% 0.00% 6.32% 
Vol usia P Scan 184,243 155 448 603 0.08% 0.24% 0.33% 
Wakulla Punch 8,587 430 430 0.00% 0.00% 5.01% 
Walton P Scan 18,537 72 133 205 0.39% 0.72% 1.11% 
Washington P Scan 8,350 37 292 329 0.44% 3.50% 3.94% 
Totals 6,138,495 106,318 63,682 8,610 178,610 1.73% 1.04% 2.91% 
Summary by voting method 
Voting # Total Over- Under- Un- Total Over- Under- Total 
Method Counties Ballots votes votes known Re.iects vote% vote% Reject% 
P Scan 26 2,072,341 6,141 5,519 4,845 16,505 0.30% 0.27% 0.80% 
Machine I 62,623 175 175 0.00% 0.00% 0.28% 
Punch 24 3,718,548 86,767 55,937 3,161 145,865 2.33% 1.50% 3.92% 
C Scan 15 280,899 13,410 2,226 171 15,807 4.77% 0.79% 5.63% 
Paper I 4,084 258 258 0.00% 0.00% 6.32% 
• Sources: 67 Counties, 4 Voting Methods, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 26, 2000, at 29A, available at 
2000 WLNR 1677446 (voting methods); Susan Schmidt, Statewide Scramble, WASHINGTON POST, 
Dec. 9, 2000, at AOI; Jennifer Sergent, 'Under-Votes' and 'Over-Votes' Called Typical in State, 
STUART NEWS (Stuart, Fla.), Dec. 3, 2000, at AI, available at 2000 WLNR 7603637 (providing 
undervote and overvote totals; some appear to be transposed or missing when compared to Schmidt, 
supra, in which case Schmidt's numbers were preferred). Palm Beach's numbers are based on data 
obtained from Palm Beach County election officials and my own calculations. See supra note 46. There 
are many disparate sources; this does not purport to be a definitive account. See, e.g., 67 Counties 67 
Recounts, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at 6x, available at 2001 WLNR 11081956 
(providing total rejection percentages that differ somewhat from those compiled here). 
•• P Scan systems tally ballots in the precinct, so that voters have a chance to correct errors. C Scan 
ballots are centrally processed and do not afford this opportunity. 

